great gallantry in action, and in my judgment all they require to make good and reliable soldiers is a little more drill and discipline.

The result of the action at Rich Mountain, as nearly as can be ascertained, were as follows:

Our loss in killed, 12; wounded, 59; no prisoners. The loss of the enemy in killed, 135; wounded and prisoners not yet reported, as near as can be determined between 800 and 900. Two brass 6-pounder cannon, a large number of muskets, two stands of colors, and other property were take. Two 6-pounder brass cannon were captured at the lower entrenchments with a large wagon train, with horses and a large number of tents.

But the really important results of these operations are the complete rout and annihilation of the rebel forces; the capture of one and the death of the other of their leaders; that the position of Western Virginia is entirely freed from their presence, and that there is now not one single organized band of the rebels on this side of the mountain north of the Kanawha Valley.

After my arrival at Beverly I received a note from Colonel Pegram, containing a proposition to surrender his command as prisoners of war. This note with my reply are inclosed. His command, consisting of 33 commissioned officers and 560 men, are now prisoners.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,

Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

Colonel E. D. TOWNSEND,

Asst. Adjt. General, Hdqrs. of the Army, Washington, D. C.

[Inclosure Numbers 1.]

Instructions to General T. A. Morris.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,
Buckhannon, Va., July 3, 1861.

General T. A. MORRIS, Philippi:

GENERAL: Yours of the 2nd has reached me. After questioning your messenger and hearing his full story, I confess that i do not share your apprehensions, and that I am not a little surprised that you feel the defense of Philippi so hazardous and dangerous an operation. If four thousand (nearly) of our men, in a position selected and fortified in advance, with ample time to examine the ground carefully and provide against any possibly plan of attack, are not enough to hold the place against any force these people can bring against it, I think we had better all go home at once. If we cannot fight in position, I am much mistaken as to our men.

I have, however, in deference to your views, ordered the Sixth Ohio on temporary duty with you until the crisis has passed, although I believe they can employed to more advantage at other points. This is all the re-enforcement I can now spare. As to the one or two squadrons of efficient cavalry asked for by Captain Benham, it seems hardly necessary for me to repeat that I have only one and a half companies, such as they are, and that more important duty is for them here.

You have only to defend a strong position, or, at most, to follow a retreating enemy. I fear you do not share the confidence I feel in our men, and that you regard their cavalry as more dangerous than I do. I feel that these men of ours can be worked up to any deed of daring, that their leaders can make them cool under fire, and that a couple of