regiment at Annapolis and the others at the junction; to hold both positions, guard the road, and report to Lieutenant-General Scott for instructions.

I venture respectfully to suggest, for the consideration of the General-in-Chief, that inasmuch as the force at my disposal is entirely inadequate to open the way and guard the railroad from Gunpowder to Baltimore-and as I learn that all the regiments from the North and East are going by sea from Eastern ports I can hope for no substantial re-enforcements from that quarter-it will be best to adopt as our line of communication the Baltimore Railroad from here to Havre de Grace, the new boat of the rail company, with propellers and Government steamers, well armed, to serve to escorts from here to Annapolis. The road from Annapolis to Washington can be protected without great difficulty, as there are no bridges, and a few small war steamers can keep the Susquehanna and Chesapeake clear, and, if need be, aid Fort McHenry and threaten Baltimore, also blockade it; the road from here to Havre de Grace occupied and protected; a battery erected or war vessel (steamer, if it can be spared) to command the Susquehanna and cover Cecil and Havre de Grace. All available steam vessels and other craft to be concentrated at Cecil or Perryville, the railroad terminus at the Susquehanna.

The garrison at Fort McHenry should prevent any steamboat, steam vessel, or any other craft hostile (or that the commander has reason to suppose hostile), from leaving Baltimore.

The Government forthwith to take possession of the railway line from Washington to Annapolis.

When we have sufficient troops and provisions, they shall be concentrated at Washington by means of the Annapolis route. The Government can take possession of the Washington Branch of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the railway lines from Baltimore to Harrisburg, and thereby secure a safe and speedy means of communicating with Washington.

These suggestions are with diffidence submitted to the better judgment of the General-in-Chief, who will at once see whether they are judicious or otherwise.

I have also to suggest that in my opinion it is expedient to declare or put the entire line, and ten, twenty, or thirty miles on each side, or the entire department under my command, under martial law; and if the General concurs, I ask his approval, or rather that he will give the order.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. PATTERSON,

Major-General.

BALTIMORE, MD., April 21, 1861.

Mr. TALCOTT, Manager, Washington Office:

The authorities have possession of office.

IKE.

Of course this stops all.

TALCOTT.

STATE OF MARYLAND, EXECUTIVE CHAMBER, Annapolis, April 21, 1861.

To the Commander of the Volunteer Troops on board the steamer:

SIR: I would most earnestly advise that you do not land your men at Annapolis. The excitement here is very great, and I think that you