General Jackson, and a reserve of 5,500 men under General Johnston near Bunker Hill. He also reports twenty to twenty-four guns and a large cavalry force with General Jackson, and thinks that General Negley, whose brigade is on my left, near Sharpsburg, will be attacked-the river being fordable at almost every point. To meet this force of 15,000 men, with twenty-two guns, and nearly 1,000 cavalry, I have about 10,000 volunteer infantry, and 650 cavalry and artillery, the latter being nearly all recruits. The horses are untrained and we are still without harness for the battery.

I have repeatedly asked for batteries, and ought to have one for each brigade, but have none. The only one fit for service sent me was the Rhode Island Battery, and that the General-n-Chief was compelled, by the necessities of his own position, to take from me when most wanted, and within a week after it joined me. I have neither cavalry nor artillery sufficient to defend the fords of the river between Harper's Ferry and Hancock, but I would much rather attack than defend, and would have far more confidence in the result. While I will not on my own responsibility attack, without artillery, a superior force, I will do so cheerfully and promptly if the General-in-Chief will give me an explicit order to that effect.

To insure success, I respectfully, but earnestly, request that the troops taken from me when Washington was menaced be sent to me with all speed, with a number of field guns equal to those of the insurgents. I will then be enabled to choose my point of attack, offer battle to the enemy, and, I trust, drive them before me, clearing the valley in front, and taking such position as the General-in-Chief may indicate.

I respectfully suggest that Colonel Stone's column be sent me, with order re-enforcements, and venture to add that the sooner I am re-enforced with reliable troops and abundant field artillery the better. I am making arrangements for crossing the river, and will do-so with-out waiting for orders or re-enforcements, if I find that the strength of the enemy has been overrated.

I beg to remind the General-in-Chief that the period of service of nearly all the troops here will expire within a month, and that if we do not meet the enemy with them, we will be in no condition to do so for three months to come. The new regimens will not be fit for service before September, if then, and meanwhile this whole frontier will be exposed.

I have got my command into as god condition as I could expect in so short a time. Officers and men are anxious to be led against the insurgents, and if the General-in-Chief will give me a regiment of regulars and an adequate force of field artillery I will corss the river and attack the enemy, unless their forces are ascertained to be more than two to one.

I beg you to assure the General-in-Chief of my sincere desire to sustain him faithfully, and to promote, by all the resources at my command, the success of his general plan of operations.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. PATTERSON,

Major-General, Commanding.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, Wheeling, June 28, 1861.

Honorable S. CAMERON,

Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

SIR: I am happy to inform you that nearly the whole of the three regi-