serve all the field pieces your army may have. There will also be at hand as many cavalry as you may want, but not regularly equipped. The Missourians will furnish promptly men and horses enough to drive every man of the enemy's forces far from Arkansas and back into Illinois. They want arms and organization, especially muskets with bayonets, and field artillery. Under command of the accomplished generals you have sent to Arkansas organization will soon be effected, and the deficiency of small-arms, which you cannot furnish, will be partially, and perhaps effectively, supplied by the private arms of the Missouri volunteers. In this way, I confidently believe, the enemy may be driven out of Missouri, and thus the safety of Arkansas and Tennessee and of the whole valley of the Mississippi be effectually secured; for the troops of Mr. Lincoln will never venture to descend the river with an enemy in their rear so powerful as the State of Missouri in arms against them and threatening Illinois and Iowa. Thus may be military operations be transferred from Arkansas and Tennessee to Missouri, and the battles of those States be fought on Missouri soil, to which the people of Missouri cordially invite you.

The danger of the invasion of Arkansas and the difficulty of driving back the enemy's forces threatening that State have been greatly increased by the delay, for the most part unavoidable, in sending troops to North Arkansas. Three weeks ago half the number would have accomplished the object, and every day's delay adds to the difficulties to be overcome. In view of the importance of prompt action, and of the magnitude of the object to be effected, I trust you will pardon me for suggesting that a portion of the troops now organized and ready for the field in North Carolina, or some other of the Confederate States, be dispatched to General Hardee's command, and that General Polk be instructed to inquire if a portion of his command now in Tennessee could not with advantage to the service be ordered to Northeast Arkansas.

On the approach of any force you may order to the Missouri frontier, the citizens of Missouri will, as I have intimated, flock to your standard. They, as well as the executive of the State, desire that the chief military operations in the State shall be under the direction of your commanding officers when they enter Missouri. I would therefore suggest that provision be made for a much larger force than you may send to Arkansas. There are thousands of Missourians willing and anxious to volunteer in the service of the Confederate States, with the expectation of being employed in repelling the threatened invasion of Arkansas, which they know can best, and indeed alone, be effected by driving back the enemy's forces now in Missouri and approaching the borders of Arkansas. Please inform me if you will receive volunteers from Missouri in companies or regiments, and how many and on what conditions. Their organization may be effected in Missouri, but if that is deemed unadvisable, they may organize in Arkansas. More troops will certainly be wanted in that quarter, and I suggest that Missouri volunteers be organized and received, whether they can be armed at present or not. We hope that arms may be had soon, and when they come these troops will be on the spot, ready for action. Missouri can supply brave and loyal men, if organized and armed, not only to drive out the invaders of her soil, but enough to furnish 30,000 good soldiers to fight the battles of the Confederate States elsewhere. Colonel Bowen's regiment at Memphis is by this time full and with but few arms. It seems to me that there can be no more urgent demand for