marches directly upon Greenville, which you will see by the map is on the direct road to Ironton, and that he leaves me to clear away the forces accumulating on the river, intending to engage my force if I do not dodge them by going out through the mountain, and then these forces may be thrown upon our rear. I must engage the force at Cape Girardeau. I cannot leave it in rear, and were I to do so, if it did not fall upon my rear it would certainly throw itself against my base here. I therefore consider it a necessity to engage that force. In doing so, I will have to fight the forces now at Bird's Point, for it will certainly be thrown up to the Cape when my movements indicate my route. As I cannot have the co-operation of Hardee's force, I wish you to send me two or three more regiments as promptly as practicable. There is no use in the forces remaining at Randolph and Fort Pillow, while I am in possession of the river above and occupy his entire forces above. He has no preparation for a river movement; his gunboats cannot get out of the Ohio; he has no fleet of steamboats adequate for the purpose, and he can take no step towards such a movement for want of troops. The force at these points ought to be advanced to my support at once, leaving the artillery companies to take care of the guns. You might, without any sort of risk, send one of the Union City regiments to occupy the position at Fort Pillow or Randolph, if you thought proper. It is certain my five regiments (weakened by sickness to an average of about 700) and battalion of infantry, 395 strong, and my cavalry, is too small a force to advance upon such duty, especially when I leave a sufficient force here to garrison the posts. I do not place much confidence, as you will perceive, on Thompson's force-less since I know its character and manner in which it is armed than I did before. If you will send me Walker's and Neely's regiments I will move in three days after their arrival, and I will cut my way through to Ironton, and there form a union with Hardee.

I address this dispatch for the express purpose of getting you to advance these two regiments. They are more efficient than any other regiment remaining below. If we can push the movement forward rapidly now, we can do the work of expelling the enemy promptly and return. The swamp makes it impossible to form a union with Hardee, as he has taken the Greenville route. If you will authorize me to act upon my own judgment I will at once order up these two regiments, and occupy the works below with a battalion in each of Martin's or a Union City regiment. Give me the force as early as possible. I have the Cheeny in possession; she was captured and brought down last night by four gentlemen from Mobile.

Hardee says in his dispatch that McCulloch was about to advance on Springfield. I have sent back nearly all my transports. The new Falls City, the Winson, the Simons, and others, are below.

Please advise me as early as possible what you determine upon.

Your obedient servant,

GID. J. PILLOW,

General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY LIBERATION,
August 2, 1861.

Major-General POLK:

I wrote you this morning. I now write you for the purpose of saying that it is impossible to organize a company of artillery here capable of