OPERATIONS IN TEX., N. MEX., AND ARIZ.[CHAP. XI.
be brisker, and came rather to the conclusion that they were only an advance picket of 12 or 15 men, who were trying to rout my camp by frightening us under cover of night, and who would retreat before daylight, satisfied to have aa big laugh at us.
I had already sent an express (Lorenzo Tobats and Felis Gallegas) to Fort Craig, and determined to make a stand. I feel back behind some houses and fences, ceased firing at random, and, no shots being fired by the enemy for some time, I thought they had perhaps already retreated. I then tried to bring some of my men back, and used all kinds of means to prevent the enemy finding out the real number of my men on hand. I then tried to bring some of my men back, and used all kinds of means to prevent the enemy finding out the real number of my men on hand. I went on foot with a few others into the town, in order to find out something about the number and doings of the enemy, penetrating from house to house. Nothing could be seen. I thought the enemy must either have evacuated the town or it was a ruse to bring us out. I did not deem it prudent t go nay farther; went back to my camp, where I found that the number of my men had again diminished. I ordered Lieutenant Sanches to bring some of the men back, if there was any possibility to do so before daybreak, and called on volunteers to ride with me into the town to drive the enemy out if they were only few in numbers, or to set fire to some of the small outside houses, from which the enemy could fire at us, and which, at all events, would break the eternal darkness. Provided with matches and some dry wood, in company with Lieutenants Medina, Sergeant Mennett, and a few others, mounted and advanced towards the town, where, to our great surprise, we were received by a pretty smart musketry. We soon found out that we had made a wrong calculation as to the strength of the enemy, and in less than ten minutes were again at the very spot from whence we had started. At this hour of the morning a portion of the enemy took position at an elevated place to out right, near the road leading to Fort Craig, so that a retreat en masse would have been observed, and provoked the enemy not only to pursue us, but also those of my company enemy were, would have overtaken most of our horses and men in less than half an hour. At this time (nearly daybreak) I found my whole force reduced to 10 men. Nothing else could then be done but entertain the enemy and prevent the pursuit of the main body of my company. This was done by loud commands, as if the whole company were still present, and occasional firing for more than an hour, with the los of only one teamster (John Morrin), wounded in the beg.
Seeing at last, by aid of my spy-glass, that the enemy were more than 60 horsemen strong and preparing to charge us, that retreat was utterly impossible for the few still with me, and further resistance would only lead to a useless butchery, I surrendered between 7 and 8 a. m., after having saved nearly all the men, horses, and arms of my company, but bound to lose 3 wagons, 12 mules, and a few horses, about 15 arms (carbines and pistols), besides all our camp equipage, one and a half boxes of cartridges, rations on hand, and a small lot of old saddles and blankets, which were mostly and all destroyed by the enemy. The enemy had none excellent horse killed and a few others wounded.
After my surrender I found the enemy's forces consisted of Captain Coopwood's spy company, 45 men strong, a detachment of Captain Pyron's company. Total, 114 men. They say that some of my men were killed, but I am not aware of this, although I took before we left Alamosa, great pains to ascertain this fact. It may be possible that I have on this occasion committed some errors. I am aware that I have,
