CHAP. XI.] CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.-UNION.

Albuquerque and Fort Union, but it will be some time before the company intended for your post can reach it, and in the mean time the lieutenant-colonel commanding does not wish the strength of the garrison at Fort Union to be reduced below 200 men without calling for the volunteers.

You will please report as early as possible any information that you may obtain in reference to the state of affairs in the country to the east and south of your post.

Three or four Indians will be sent from this place to Lieutenant Walker's party, at Hatch's ranch, to be used for the same purpose at those you are authorized to employ. Instruction in regard to their employment similar to the above will be sent from these headquarters to Lieutenant Walker.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

A. L. ANDERSON, Second Lieutenant, Fifth Inf., A. A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEX MEXICO, Santa Fe, N. Mex., June 20, 1861.

SIR: I have the honor to submit for the consideration of the General-in-Chief the following statements and suggestions in relation to the service of this department, basing them upon the supposition that it from Indian hostilities, but to defend the country gains invasion and to guard our communications with the East-at least as far as the crossing of the Arkansas.

In this view Fort Fillmore, or preferably Fort Bliss, on the south, and Forts Union and Stanton, on the east, will be important strategical points, and should be strongly garrisoned with, if possible, a large portion of each command-regular troops, both infantry and cavalry. Fort Garland and Fort Craig are of subordinate importance, but their garrisons should be determined by the same considerations. The principal depot (Albuquerque) should also be guarded by regular troops.

Fort Fillmore, Fort Stanton, and Fort Union are at remote and exposed points, and it will not be well to trust either entirely to new and undisciplined troops. Seven-tenths of the population and resources of the Territory and all the military supplies (in depot) are north of Fort Craig; hence the necessity for a strong and reliable garrison at that point, for the purpose of keeping open the communication with and supporting the posts in the South. Fort Garland, commanding the route to Colorado Territory, will be important in the event of political troubles in this country. This contingency is not anticipated, but it will not bee wise to disregard it entirely. The contemplated change of the depot at remover the necessity for separate garrison for the depot, but under existing circumstances it will not be prudent to establish it at a point where it would be exposed to the danger of being broken up by the operations of a war. To distribute the regular force left in the department at the points above indicated would leave nor serve, and would disseminate them os widely that they could not be concentrated to meet any emergency.

From a full consideration of the subject, it is subject, it is my opinion that one of