OPERATIONS IN TEX., N.MEX.,AND ARIZ. [CHAP.XI.

less than twelve hours, and thence to Saluria or this post in such time as favorable or unfavorable winds and tides might determine. Other re-enforcements would of course soon follow; but is it not prudent to suppose that if an attack be made upon this point of our coast it will be with a large and an invading force [a force susceptible of division], a portion landing below on the island and attacking us in the rear, while with their main body the enemy could pass up the channel, overwhelming our position with their superior numbers, and this, too, before re-enforcements could reach us. In view of these facts and suggestions, would it not be advisable to construct a good military road from Indianola to the Pass, providing ample and well-attended ferries on the large bayous [boats for this purpose can be had already built], and to construct bridges over the smaller ones? Would it not be prudent, as a measure of safety against surprise, to have Captain Beaumont's cavalry company, which is now stationed at Victoria, removed to the island, to range as scouts down the coast, to cut off detached parties, should any land, and to give information of the movements of the enemy if he made his appearance below? In addition to the foregoing measures of prudence and safety, would it not render our defenses certain, or our retreat entirely safe, to have five companies of infantry, now in camp at Victoria, removed to the island? There they could drill as well as at Victoria. It is a healthy position, and provisions, fuel, and water can be had at slight advances on the present prices. In case of an attack, they could render immediate and efficient service, and, I apprehend, could reach as promptly any other point of attack on our coast as from Victoria. I think that Captain Pearson's company, from Matagorda, and Captain Phillips,' from Lavaca, at least, should be required to return immediately to the coast whence they were taken. It does occur to me that the post should not only be strengthened, but that means of supplying it with re-enforcements should be provided, or that the position should be abandoned, and the guns, together, with the forces, removed to Indianola or some other point, where assistance could with certainty reach them. The men we now have there will fight until there are none left to tell the story. But why imperil the lives of our brave men? Why keep up a mere show of defense when we really have none, the effect being only to cause the public mind to sleep in its insecurity? Captain Shea, commanding the post, I understand, has no authority to take action in the premises. Colonel McCulloch, I learn, declines making any changes until your arrival. Our people have been anxiously awaiting your presence at this point, and hence there is nothing being done. There is a heavy responsibility resting somewhere. Our lives and property are in danger. I realize the fact with painful anxiety. Hence I venture these suggestions, and although we have no personal acquaintance, yet I apprehend that your position in the State, and the interest which I feel in the welfare of this particular section of our country, will render an apology for this communication unnecessary.

In conclusion, I have only to add that the suggestions which I have made are intended only to call your attention to the military condition of this section of country, and to urge you, if your whole time is occupied at Galveston and adjacent points, to appoint some person competent to the command, and with full authority to give directions to our defenses.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D.M. STAPP, [Brigadier-General, Texas Militia.]