CHAP.XII.] CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.-CONFEDERATE.

P. S.-Colonel Forrest's regiment cavalry, as fine a body of men as ever went to the field, has gone to Dover or Fort Donelson. Give Forrest a chance and he will distinguish himself.

BOWLING GREEN, November 4, 1861.

Major General LEONIDAS POLK:

General Johnston directs you to send 5,000 troops, with two field batteries, to Clarskville. Let there be a fair proportion of cavalry. Put General Pillow in command. Let him use the railed or march, or do both, in his discretion, but be prompt and say nothing of his destination.

W. W. MACKALL, Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT, November 4, 1861.

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON, Bowling Green, Ky.:

GENERAL: I have this evening received your dispatch ordering 5,000 troops of the force under my command to be sent forward to Clarskville. I telegraphed you in reply that measures were taken immediately to execute your orders. These measures are now being carried out. It is, however, due to you and to myself to submit to you, very respectfully my views in regard to the proposed movement. Without attempting to undervalue the importance of force on the cumberland and in experienced hands, as will be seen from letter of the 31st ultimo, I am deeply impressed with the serious consequences that may follow from weakening the force at this place. Indeed, it was in the midst of a conference of all the general officers under my command, assembled for consultation, that your dispatch was received. We had agreed that in view of the information in our possession it was a matter of serious doubt whether we would be able to make successful resistance to the large force now being concentrated in our front with so small an army as that under our command. The fort is now nearly completed and armed, so that we have had time to turn to other dispositions and to consider plans for general defense. It was agreed by us all that to attack Paducah with its present defenses and the facility with which aid could be had by steamers from Cairo and its vicinity, while it might be successful, would be attended with great difficulty,and the prevailing opinion was that it would be not less difficult to hold it, should it be taken with so small a force as ours. If that should be abandoned, then we must taken, with so small a force as ours. If that should be abandoned, then we must take the field in the direction of Mayfield to prevent being flanked, and occupy the strongest positions offered in that direction. To do this successfully wit the force at my command would involve extraordinary exertion and good fortune. If then my force should be reduced by taking from it 5,000 men, I do not hesitate to say that for me to protect my flank with the remainder would be impossible. In that case the utmost that could be donE would be to offer the best resistance possible, with the assurance that from the disparity of numbers isolation would be inevitable. We shall, of course, endeavor to do our duty, but I think to proper respectfully to submit these views as those which weigh upon my mind in view of the condition in which this command will be by the withdrawal of the force called for. That my im-

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