CHAP.XII.] CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.-CONFEDERATE.
have definite information respecting Williams' intentions," and "if Williams retires by Pound Gap your (my) forward movement must be from Abingdon, where your troops should be concentrated in that event."
I left Witheville the day before yesterday (Sunday, 10th), having ordered Moore to detach his major to move the two companies of his regiment which are on the road between Abingdon and Pound Gap immediately to Pound Gap, and to follow himself with the other five companies so soon as his arms arrived (for he had no arms for the five companies so late as last Sunday, and he had no blankets or overcoats, and I did not intend to wait for them). I ordered Trigg to move on this road with Jeffries' battery so soon as his transportation arrived (expected to arrive Sunday, and did so arrive). I would not wait for the caisson any longer, but ordered the gun and ammunition to be brought along, and a squad to remain and bring up the empty caisson. I came forward alone, and met the courier at Sharon, 18 miles from Wytheville, returning from Williams, and received there the intelligence from Williams that he occupied the night of the 8th "in preparing to fall back in the direction of Pound Gap," and that he should "fall back until I (he) can make a stand or am re-enforced. Our route will be towards Abingdon." I send inclosed herewith Colonel Williams' letter to me,* remarking thereon that Colonel Williams was not personally in the action he describes, but it was fought by Captain Jack May; and I have learned from very cool and intelligent soldiers who participated in the fight that the action lasted about three-quarters of an hour-300 on our side against 1,500 on the other side; our loss some 5 or 6 killed, 15 to 18 wounded; theirs very heavy-from 175 to 200 killed and wounded. Their force consisted solely of infantry and artillery. The ambuscade was very perfect, and the action a very decided success.
I have no means of knowing at this moment whether the enemy occupies Pileton, for from all I hear from credible sources I think he has cautiously taken just what has been abandoned to him. I do not mean to intimate that any point has been abandoned unwisely or precipitately, for I have no means of forming a military judgment on these points, and I appreciate the since of responsibility under which an officer acts who has charge of an undisciplined and badly-armed force; yet I see no reason for alarm, exactly, in the events which have transpired in the movements from Prestonburg to Piketon, &c.
Colonel Williams does not account at all for one of the columns he heard was moving upon his flank, nor does he estimated the size of the other on John's Creek. the central one is properly estimated at 1,500 in sight at the action of the 8th, which occurred 12 miles below Pileton, and it may be that this force all came from Paintsville or all came from Prestonburg. My speculation is that the enemy by this time has occupied Piketon, and this judgment is founded on the idea that he will do so when he finds it has been abandoned. Where will he then go? Will he pursue Williams to pound Gap, or will he let Williams go, and come through what he supposes to be an unobstructed country down upon this road, pass Buchanan County, descend upon Richland, (20 miles from this point), destroy the salt works and the railroad between Wytheville and Abingdon, and hold a position at Richland until re-enforced? This can be done, sir, by 300 cavalry, who would be perfectly unobstructed, and who could ravage all the country to the vicinity of Wytheville. The loss to us would be irreparable, for the whole Confederacy depends upon these salt works greatly.
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*See reports of engagement of Ivy Mountain, &c., November 8, 9, pp. 227, 228.
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