until he gets more. The bombardment of Fort Jackson will doubtless consume pretty much of the stock on board ships, and, when taken, the mortar vessels can do no more in the river, and a large part of the fleet can be spared. It should go at once to Mobile and bombard Fort Morgan. That work is much like Fort Jackson internally, and stands alone. Fort Gaines(Dauphin Island) is over 3 miles off. (If we had gunboats drawing not over 9 feet I cannot see what would prevent their entering Mobile Bay now and occupying it.)

For this bombardment a large surplus of shells and ships's ammunition should be collected at Ship Island. Forts Jackson and Morgan taken, whether the mortar fleet should go to Pensacola (a place of no importance, unless it be to release our flee blockade there), or to Charleston, or Pulaski (if that has not fallen), would depend on the situation at the time.

Now as to Savannah: If the city is so thoroughly fortified as to require a siege, it is not worth sieving. I did not know but Fort Jackson might be intended by Sherman, but that is a very insignificant work, and ought to be taken with a dash, combined with a gunboat operation, or let alone. We have the river above Pulaski, and have cut off all its communications. I don't see why the gunboats cannot ascend to Savannah; but if they cannot, or can only do it at the expense of a siege, there's no sufficient object. Looking at Fort Pulaski, I find it is a work of interior area about equal to Fort Jackson (Mississippi), with one casemate and one barbetter tier. In the gorge are quarters; in front a demi-lune. There is very little fire up in the faces of the demi-lune (not more than ten or twelve barbette guns could be put in each), being too oblique to act in positions where I have masked "gunboats," and if rebels attempt to mount any on the gorge, a battery on its prolongation would enfilade it. The nares point of Tybee Island is about a mile; here batteries of heavy rifled cannon would operate principally on the walls (and 24-pounder siege guns be good for nothing) and mortars behind. I think fifteen mortars (13-inch), with a few batteries of heavy guns and the cooperation of the fleet, would soon reduce Pulaski; and I think it quite likely the heavy ships of the feet could, with the help of their land batteries, cross the souther (Tybee Island) channel and co-operate. One thing is certain, the work would soon use up all its ammunition, and would become a helpless recipient of our shot and shells, under the play of which it must surrender.

The capture of Pulaski is the capture of everything valuable-the port, the river, the city of Savannah; and I think the taking of such works is calculated to exert a powerful influence on public opinion abroad.

Woodbury has discussed the siege of Charleston, or rather the capture of the works (Sumter and Moultrie). It is a difficult undertaking, would require some preparation, and at least two iron-clad vessel, supposing Pulaski taken and Burnside to have taken Fort Macon (and perhaps Caswell).

I was just about to write that I did not approve of Burnside's march to Goldsborough as accomplishing nothing permanent, and running a risk for that nothing, while at Beaufort and Wilmingston he cloud effect decisive results, but the news from Fort Donelson has come in, and we can march anywhere, I take it. This knocks all present calculations in the head, and we must try to do something off-hand, or the Army of the Potomac will find the war finished without its aid. Seems to me we ought not to lose a moment in seizing Norfolk, and then we can operate