the failure of colonels of regiments to report to him on their arrival and partly from an interruption of telegraphic communication. All these irregularities have now been remedied.

H. W. HALLECK,

Major-General.

CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.

ORDNANCE OFFICE,

Nashville, Tenn., November 20, 1862.

Colonel W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Nashville:

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith, for the information of the general commanding, a copy of telegram received from the Chief of Ordnance, Richmond, under date of 19th instant, in reply to one from this office of same date:

RICHMOND, November 19, 1861.

Lieutenant WRIGHT, Nashville:

About 5,000 rifles are assigned to General Johnston out of those received. You can have as much money as you want for purchase.

J. GORGAS.

From this I suppose that I will be authorized to purchase good, serviceable arms as required.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. H. WRIGHT,

First Lieutenant Artillery and Ordnance, C. S. Army.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
Columbus, Ky., November 20, 1861.

General SAM. D. WEAKLEY, JAMES E. SAUNDERS, and others,

Committee, Alabama:

In reply to your verbal inquires, I have to say that our position here is of great strength, and that we can hold it agonist greatly superior numbers of the enemy; but unless we are supported on the flank and rear by forces to strengthen our present column, now at Feliciana, near Union City, the country south of us is open to an advancing column, and by cutting or railroad communication we would be isolated from the country south of this position. If this was done, and the enemy should seize New Madrid (which he can easily do) and fortify it, cutting our river communication, and thus cutting off our supplies by land and water, it is manifest that the force at this place would soon be starved out. Without additional force at this place the same result may take place by a force of 30,000 or 40,000 men investing the place and reducing it by famine. In the event of this place being reduced by this mode, the result would be the same, viz, the loss of the army and all its arms, artillery, &c., the opening of the river to the Gulf of Mexico, and isolating all the country west of the Mississippi, with all it untold wealth. The magnitude of the calamity to the country can be appreciated by those only who know. In regard to the question, Do I consider