in front of the right of my infantry, which was in line of battle about 150 yards in his rear.

The battery was further supported by a cross-fire from Mann's battery and Ross' battery, placed about 400 yards to due left, and by the fire of the First Brigade, lying immediately behind the last-named batteries and extending to the right and left of them.

The spot selected was in an open grove of large trees, and, had Captain Meyers or any of his officers understood anything of their duty, as safe a position for field as could be. It was easy also to retire from, as there were but 100 yards of open woods too pass over before he would be in rear of the infantry and also upon a good road. But Captain Myers, in endeavoring to place his guns, brought them rather too far forward, so as to lose the advantage of the slope; still the position was not as much exposed as that of Mann's battery, which was in the open field.

Having these preliminary statements, I now copy from my official report, and reaffirm that every word of it in relation to this battery is true:

A single shot from the enemy's batteries struck in Myers' Thirteenth Ohio Battery, when officers and men, with a common impulse of disgraceful cowardice, abandoned the entire battery, horses, caissons, and guns, and fled, and I saw them no more until Tuesday.

I further state that the charge made by the anonymous scribbler and indorsed by B. Stanton, that the infantry supports fell back, is utterly false.

The Seventeenth and Twenty-fifth Kentucky and Forty-fourth Indiana, then serving with me, now detached, were the nearest regiments and neither they nor any other regiment or part of a regiment yielded an inch for many hours after the cowards, who disgraced their State and their flag, had deserted their comrades.

That they were exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery is true, and as long as the laws of optics remain I confess that I know no way in which field artillery can see an enemy's battery and do execution without being liable to be seen and reached by them. I have always supposed that artillery were expected to meet artillery, and it has been left for this age of invention and for the State of Ohio to produce military support the infantry against infantry,, and the other-B. Stanton- that infantry did not support artillery against artillery. They were never exposed for one moment to infantry fire and lost but one man.

If their position was untenable (which it was not), they could have safely retired; but it was a panic, and they ran.

That officers and men were ignorant of duty and of drill I have no doubt. The responsibility of that rests elsewhere. The paper hereto appended, marked A, * shows some of the reasons of this ignorance. During the two days of the battle Captain Myers was not heard from, and was probably skulking beneath the bank of the Landing.

On Tuesday, the 8th, when danger was over and rations were needed, he appeared. I required of him some explanations of his conduct. At last I obtained from him the papers hereto annexed, marked B*, which sets up none of the circumstances that he and his false friends now set up as a palliation for notorious cowardice and the grounds of all attack on men who have not failed to risk their lives. These papers of themselves are sufficient.

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*Not found.

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14 R R-VOL X