About midday on the 6th instant, while two brigades of the division-the Third Ohio Cavalry, and the three batteries of Cockerill, Cochran, and Schultz, with the baggage and supply trains-were on the march toward Savannah, and about 18 miles thence, an order was received directing me to leave baggage and supply trains in the rear and to press forward with the troops, provided with three days' rations in their haversacks and 40 rounds of ammunition in the cartridge boxes. I was also ordered to bring forward the ammunition train. While arrangements were being made to carry the order into effect I received a second order, directing me to press forward as rapidly as possible with the troops, but to bring forward also all my train. An intimation also accompanied the order that the enemy had not made a substantial attack, but simply a forced reconnaissance.

I immediate recommenced the march, in compliance with the second order, but the movement was painfully slow and laborious, as the route was entirely blocked with the numerous trains of the divisions in front. It was impossible to advance more than a mile an hour. While thus engaged I received a third order at 5.30 o'clock p. m. reiterating the first order, with the additional direction not to bring on the ammunition train. I was also informed with this order that the attack seemed to be in earnest. Dispositions were at once made to comply with this order, but before these were fully completed night had fallen, and two brigades (less the Fifty-first Regiment Indiana Volunteers, left as a guard to the train) and the batteries commenced a night march over a road almost inconceivably bad and obstructed by wagon trains, many of which were immovably stuck in the mud. With all these embarrassments to impede the movement and render it laborious and slow, about 12 o'clock the darkness became impenetrable and the rain began to fall in torrents. It was impossible to see a pace in advance, and it was absolutely necessary to halt until the storm had passed and the road had become sufficiently illuminated to permit the onward movement. The troops were eager to advance to the assistance of their hard-pressed brethren, and their chafing and impatience under the inability to advance may be more readily imagined than described.

So soon as the subsidence of the storm and the faint returning light permitted the march was resumed and pressed vigorously. Savannah was reached early on the morning of the 7th, and so soon as possible the embarkation for the battle-field commenced. Wagner's brigade (the Twenty-first), consisting of the Fifteenth, Fortieth, and Fifty-seventh Indiana and Twenty-fourth Kentucky Volunteers, was first embarked. In order to hasten, by my personal supervision, the embarkation of the remainder of the troops I remained in Savannah till the Twentieth Brigade (Garfield's) embarked, and ordered one of my aide-de-camp, Captain Lennard, to accompany the Twenty-first Brigade to the battle-field and report it to the commanding general. The brigade had fully debarked by 12 m., and for its operations from that hour to my own arrival, at 1 p. m., I refer to Colonel Wagner's, report, herewith submitted, with the simple remark that it did good service in driving the enemy from his last strong stand, and compelling him, by a vigorous pursuit, into a rapid retreat. The Twentieth Brigade, consisting of the Sixty-fourth and Sixty-fifth Ohio and Thirteenth Michigan Regiments, was embarked so soon as transports were ready, and finding it would be impossible to get transportation immediately for the artillery and cavalry of my division, I accompanied this brigade. It was debarked on arriving at Pittsburg with the least possible delay, and under an order received from Major-General Grant to conduct it to whatever