was then detached to bring in and keep back stragglers. When the army fell back we acted as rear guard to Major-General Polk's corps, encamped that night near Mickey's, and reported next day to General Breckinridge.

Below I give you a list of casualties:

Killed................................................. 2

Wounded................................................ 10

Missing................................................ 1

---

Total.................................................. 13

Al of which I respectfully submit.

Your obedient servant,

R. H. BREWER,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Battalion of Cavalry.

Major GEORGE WILLIAMSON,

Assistant adjutant-General.

Numbers 166. Report of General Braxton Bragg, C. S. Army, commanding Second Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT Numbers 2,
Mobile, Ala., July 25, 1862.

SIR: Herewith I have the honor to forward my official report, as commander of the Second Corps, Army of the Mississippi, of the battle of Shiloh. The great delay, somewhat unusual with me in official matters, has resulted from a combination of unavoidable circumstances. Wishing to make it complete, the reports of all subordinates were desired; but at last several are wanting. My own time has been so much occupied, too, that it is not rendered as soon, nor is it as complete, as I could have desired.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BRAXTON BRAGG,

General, Commanding.

General S. COOPER,

Adjutant and Inspector General C. S. Army, Richmond, Va.

[Inclosure.]

HDQRS. SECOND CORPS, ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Corinth, Miss., April 30, 1862.

GENERAL: In submitting a report of the operations of my command, the Second Army Corps, in the actions of Shiloh, on the 6th and 7th of April, it is proper that the narrative of events on the field be preceded by a sketch of the march from here.

But few regiments of my command had ever made a day's march. A very large proportion of the rank and file had never performed a day's labor. Our organization had been most hasty, with great deficiency in commanders, and was therefore very imperfect. The equipment was lamentably defective for field service, and our transportation, hastily impressed in the country, was deficient in quantity and very inferior in quality. With all these drawbacks the troops marched late