24. That in cases of emergency sufficient assistance was obtained by details from the army upon the application of the parties desiring them, as was the case of the post and ordnance department at the evacuation of Corinth.

25. That there was a sufficient number of competent and efficient officers of the quartermaster's department at all times at the railroads depot at Corinth to superintend and control the railroad transportation of the army during the evacuation of that place.

26. That the transportation operations of the occasion of the evacuation of Corinth were expeditiously and successfully, conducted by energetic and competent officers of the quartermaster's department assigned to the special duty of superintending the transportation of army stores and troops from that place by rail.

27. That material aid was rendered by General Bragg and several members of his staff and some members of the staff of General Beauregard; also by other officers,as well as by Colonel Benton's regiment and other details from the army.

28. That there was no public property left in Corinth upon the evacuation of the place, except a few tents and broken wagons, some old harness,and some few shells and other ordnance stores, most of which property appears to have been damaged or condemned or not worth the cost of its transportation under the attending circumstances.

29. That there was a loss of a number of railroad engines and cars loaded with army stores upon the Memphis and Charleston Railroad on the morning of May 30, occasioned by the burning of the railroad bridges across the Hatchie and Tuscumbia Rivers, in obedience to specific orders given the officer in command at those bridges to destroy them at a certain hour.

30. That the quartermaster's department had no notice that the bridges were to be destroyed, otherwise the trains lost might have been dispatched in time to have passed the bridges or turned down the Mobile and Ohio Railroad and thus saved.

31. That there was a loss of a train of cars containing certain Government property at Booneville while standing on the track of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad on the morning of May 30, occasioned by a raid of the enemy's cavalry, over which the quartermaster's department had not control.

32. That Lieutenant-Colonel McLean was at one time during his administration of the quartermaster's department of the Army of the Mississippi and other forces afflicted with a disease which was local and not of a nature permanently to disable him from attending to all the duties required of him as chief of his department.

33. That with the exception of a few days' illinois at Corinth, about a week previous to the evacuation of that place,

Lieutenant-Colonel McLean was not unable at any time while chief quartermaster of the army to attend to all the duties were required of him, and that he did so attend promptly to all the duties devolving upon him at the time.

34. That Lieutenant-Colonel McLean is shown by the evidence to have been prompt, energetic, efficient, courteous, and considerate in the discharge of his duties as chief quartermaster of the enemy army successively under Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and Bragg, and especially solicitous for the welfare and success of the department instructed to his charge and for which he was responsible.