Embracing communication received too late for insertion in proper sequence.

UNION CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.

MARCH 7, 1862.

Col. THOMAS A. SCOOT, Cairo:

Your dispatch just received. I cannot help him promptly in the positions in which I understand he is placing himself. You can judge of the time it will require to collect transports and reach him. Then to what extent am I to re-enforce him, if the enemy has the power to concentrate and re-enforce indefinitely? Shall I not either fall short of what is necessary or else leave Nashville exposed? The enemy the same facilities for re-enforcing on this side that he has on the other. If Halleck has based his movements on a reasonable estimate of what the enemy can do his proceedings may be right; otherwise they are wrong, if not hazardous. There is but one point, Florence, at which we can act centrally, and that I have advised to seize and hold in force, if not too late. There is no other bridge over the Tennessee. You have seen enough to know that anything like concentrated action while we are on different sides of an impassable river is impossible. I have told Halleck that it is important for us to meet and understand these matters. Tell me, as well as you know, he is situated.

D. C. BUELL,

Brigadier-General.

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1862.

General D. C. BUELL,

Brigadier-General, Commanding:

It will be impossible for me to meet you at present, but is very advisable that you and General Halleck should meet as soon as possible. The subject of provisional governor was arranged by the President, and the decision is final. I think your dispatch advising against it arrived too late.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General, Commanding.

MARCH 9, 1862.

General McCLELLAN, Washington:

Reports from Carter at Cumberland Ford. River impassable. Says the Gap has been re-enforced by three or four regiments, which is probably true.