the manner in which they withdrew all the heavy guns during the seven days and from Malvern Hill. Owing to the crowded state of the roads the teams could not brought within a couple of miles of the positions, but these energetic soldiers removed the guns by hand for that distance, leaving behind.

THIRD PERIOD.

On the 1st July I received the following from the President:

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1862-3.30 p.m.

It is impossible to re-enforce you for your present emergency. If we had a million of men we could not get them to you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy you must find a place of security, and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. We still have enough in the country and will bring it out.

A. LINCOLN.

Major General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

In a dispatch from the President to me, on the 2nd of July, he says:*

If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now., I do not ask you to. Try just now to save the army, material, and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The Governors of eighteen States officer me a new levy of 300,000, which I accept.

On the 3rd of July the following kind dispatch was received from the President:#

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1862-3 p.m.

Yours of 5.30 yesterday is just received.+ I am satisfied that yourself, officers, and men have done the best you could. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it.

* * * * * * *

A. LINCOLN.

Major General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

On the 4th I sent the following to the President:@

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

Harrison's Bar, James River, July 4, 1862

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 2nd instant.

I shall make a stand at this place, and endeavor to give my men the repose they so much require.

After sending my communication on Tuesday the enemy attacked the left of our lines, and a fierce battle ensued, lasting until night. They were repulsed with great slaughter. Had their attack succeeded the consequences would have been disastrous in the extreme. This closed the hard fighting, which had continued from the afternoon of the 26th ultimo in a daily series of engagements wholly unparalleled on this continent for determination and slaughter on both sides. The mutual loss in killed and wounded is enormous: that of the enemy certainly greatest.

On Tuesday morning, the 1st, our army commenced its movement from Haxall's to this point,our line of defense there being too extended to be maintained by our

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*The entire dispatch appears in "Correspondence, etc.", Part III. The original reads: "If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army, material, " &c.

#The entire dispatch appears in "Correspondence, etc.," Part III.

+See "Correspondence, etc.," Part III.

@See also McClellan to Lincoln, 1 p. m. July 4, in "Correspondence, etc., " Part III.

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