two others in reserve, while Brigadier-General Toombs advanced with his own brigade, under the immediate command of Brigadier-General Semmes, close to the scene of action, and by my order (having just arrived) placed two regiments of this brigade into action, retaining the rest as reserves. These dispositions and the enemy's suffering from his two repulses rendered our position perfectly secure. Darkness put an end to the contest.

The dispositions of General McLaws were skillfully made; his whole bearing and conduct is deserving of the highest commendation.

I cannot designate all the many gallant officers and privates who distinguished themselves, and respectfully call the attention of the commanding general to the accompanying reports; but I would fail to do my duty if I did not specially mention some particular instances.

Brigadier-General Cobb, commanding at this point, exhibited throughout the day the greatest courage and skill, and when, once at a critical moment, some troops in his line of battle wavered, he in person rallied the troops under a terrible fire, and by his voice and example entirely re-established their steadiness.

Brigadier-General Toombs had in the morning, by my order, detached from his division Colonel Anderson's brigade to support Brigadier-General Cobb, and late in the evening, when ordered forward by me, promptly and energetically led the remainder of this command, under fire, arriving just before the enemy ceased the vigor of his attack and in time to share its dangers.

Brigadier General P. J. Semmes commanded Toombs' brigade, the latter being in command of the division, and showed his usual promptness and courage.

Colonel William M. Levy, of the Second Louisiana Regiment, was the colonel commanding at Dam Numbers 1, and evinced judgment, courage, and high soldierly qualities in his conduct and arrangements, which I desire specially to commend.

Captain Stanley was in command of two pieces of artillery, including the 6-pounder so effectively served. Both he and Lieutenant Pope conducted themselves with skill and courage.

Captain Jordan's piece was in a very exposed place, and was soon disabled, after a few rounds, and was properly withdrawn. Both he and his men exhibited great steadiness under the terrible fire which swept over them.

The enemy's loss of course cannot be accurately estimated, as the greater part of it occurred over on their side of the stream, but I think it could have scarcely been less than 600 killed and wounded.

Our own loss was comparatively trivial, owing to the earthworks, which covered our men, and did not exceed 75 killed and wounded.

All the re-enforcements which were on the way to me had not yet joined me, so that I was unable to follow up the action of April 16 by any decisive step. The re-enforcements were accompanied by officers who ranked me, and I ceased to command.

I cannot too highly commend the conduct of the officers and men of my whole command, who cheerfully submitted to the greatest hardships and deprivations.

From April 4 to May 3 this army served almost without relief in the trenches. Many companies of artillery were never relieved during this long period. It rained almost incessantly; the trenches were filled with water; the weather was exceedingly cold; no fires could be allowed; the artillery and infantry of the enemy played upon our men almost continuously day and night; the army had neither coffee, sugar, nor