The whole affair now was very simple. The enemy was invariably re- ported from 1,000. to 2,000 cavalry, some artillery. An officer had seen their infantry. No one was positive he had none. If the enemy re- turned over the road, as was then believed he would, I should soon meet him. I had under 500 cavalry; if he had no infantry, I should need the infantry for anything like certain success. If the enemy did not return I know he had been 8 miles or more ahead ten hours before at least, so that cavalry alone could not overtake him, even if it shonld pnrsue to attack three times its strength in numbers, snpported by artillery. (Mine was not horse artillery.) I expected, then, to meet him every moment, or, if he had infantry and attacked White House depot, that General Emory and a few other troops I supposed might be there would detain him until I should fall upon him with my force of three arms. The infantry marched as fast as possible. The day proved excessively warm, and they and the artil- lery suffered. Near Garlicks it became certain that White House had attacked and the depot not been , enemys motions could only be guessed. The cavalry got well ahead, with orders to halt at Tunstalls Station. Colonel Warren I authorized to halt at the first water near there. I joined the cavalry there soon after their arrival; found General Emory, and learned the enemy had been traced far southward. He marched to support Colonel Rush soon after my arrival with infantry, and I promised to overtake him with my cavalry, with which, after a necessary rest, I knew I could do at 3 oclock, but with the least hope in the world of overtaking retreating cavalry with the start I knew he had. Accordingly I commenced to march at 3 oclock, and just then received a dispatch from General Emory, 4 or 5 miles off, I believe at Baltimore Cross-Roads, that the enemy had escaped over the Chicka- hominy, and at the same moment another from Colonel Rush, 13 or 14 miles off, to the same effect. I bivouacked, and returned early next morning, the 15th. I inclose the reports of Brigadier-General Emory, Colonels Blake, Rush, and Grier, Major Williams, Captain Whiting, and Lieutenant Hoyer. Very respectfully, ~. ST. GEG. COOKE, Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding. Capt. FRED. T. LOCKE, Asst. A djt. Gen., Fifth Provisional Army Corps. HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISiON, Camp on Cold Harbor Road, June 19, 1862. SIR: I returned the 15th instant from forty-eight hours ~hard duty in the hottest weather of the season, getting no sleep for thirty-six hours, to receive after dark long orders about every half hour chiefly regard- ing a new duty of picketing 10 or 12 miles about the same distance off; making large detachments at midnight, and next day, after six or seven hours, constantly receiving, considering, and sending dispatches to out parties, Major Clitz called on me with the astonishing communication that he was sent to investigate some parts of my conduct. The reports had been ordered to be sent in that morning, which was impossible. tTnder these trying circumstances I wrote hastily a statement, which (Major Clitz not returning next morning) I sent iu as a report. Thus