now very bad. For these reasons I hope that we shall have enough breathing space to reorganize and rest the men and get them into position before the enemy can attack again. I have ordered Burnside to bring up all his available force, and leave to your judgment the question of evacuating New Berne and its dependencies, so as to bring any available men to re-enforce this army. It is of course impossible to estimate as yet our losses, but I doubt whether there are to-day more than 50,000 men with their colors.

To accomplish the great task of capturing Richmond and putting an end to this rebellion re-enforcements should be sent to me rather much over than much less than 100,000 men.

I beg that you will be fully impressed by the magnitude of the crisis in which we are placed. We require action on a gigantic scale-one commensurate with the views I expressed in a memorandum to the President submitted early last August, when first ordered to command the Army of the Potomac. The safety of the country and the preservation of its honor demand the utmost energy and intelligence.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS,
July 3, 1862-12.30 p.m.

Major-General McCLELLAN, Commanding:

Captain Reno has just returned from a reconnaissance on the Charles City road. He went almost 1 1/4 miles from the mill near General Keyes' headquarters, when he found the enemy. They had two guns in position on the right of the road and were firing across the creek in the direction of Kearny's camp. Their battery was supported by a force of cavalry and infantry. He could not see many men, and thinks the force was a small one. Some of the shells went over the woods and fell in this field several hundred yards beyond the road. Captain Reno's party was near their cavalry; he thinks they had but one squadron.

Very respectfully, &c.,

S. P. HEINTZELMAN,

Brigadier-General.

HDQRS. REAR GUARD ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
July 3, 1862-6 p.m.

General McCLELLAN:

SIR: At midnight on the 1st I was advised of your movement, and that I was to command the rear guard, consisting of my own small division. Although exhausted by unremitting labors and loss of rest. I made up my mind to give you all my energies and aim to save your whole train.

At 2 a.m. I was in the saddle with my line of battle formed on the crest this side of your headquarters. I did not dismount until every command, all the batteries wagons, and stragglers had passed my line. Although my orders were of a nature to warrant my following close to the troops and batteries, resolved to protect the whole train to the extend of my ability. After the delays consequent upon the heavy rain I decided that I would halt at the creek or run, and place a