infantry up as quick as possible, as his men were worn out and must be nearly out of ammunition. I told him the infantry was close behind and would soon be up, and that there was no doubt about our having ammunition enough, as it could not all be fired away yet. Colonel Waring sent for relief directly tome, and so did Colonel Winslow, saying he was hard pressed. I then directed General Grierson to organize all of the idle men about the cross-roads, of which there were a great many, and skulkers, and put them into the fight where they were the most needed. The enemy's bullets reached the cross-roads now very thick, and I began to fear our lines were giving away, though I couldn't see it, as the timber was so heavy, so I directed the commander of the battery to open his battery on the enemy's reserves, because I hoped to hold the place until the infantry got up, and I looked for them every moment, because if we could not hold that position we could hold no other short of Stubbs', which was ten miles to the rear, because there was no other position. In the midst of this dilemma the officer commanding the battery asked me who was to support his battery. I told him the line of cavalry in front was his support, as well as the infantry, which I expected soon to accumulate in his rear. The artillery officer then said to me that there was no cavalry in his front on the left. I insisted that there was, as I had withdrawn nothing, when a major of cavalry rode up and informed me that the artillery officer was right, that the cavalry had withdrawn on the left, as he was the last to withdraw. I asked him by whose order he withdrew, and he said that he did not know; he heard that was the order and saw the others going. Still I desired to hold the line, and having nothing to put in of any consequence, I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Hess, of the Nineteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, commanding my escort of about 100 men, to gallop down and form a sham line and keep up as much firing as possible until the infantry could arrive. This he did, at the expense of two or three killed and several wounded, and held the line until the infantry arrived. Which way the cavalry withdrew or by what authority I do not know now, but I have understood by officers since that they withdrew by the left and rear, by which route they would not pass me at all. In addition to the appeals of General Grierson to hurry up the infantry and relieve the cavalry, I received two or three messages from Colonel Winslow, in strong terms, almost demanding to be relieved. Fearing that he might withdraw without orders, I informed him that the infantry, would be up any moment to his relief, and that he must hold his place, and that if he was too hard pressed to fall back slowly toward the cross-roads and shorten and strengthen his lines. This brought us probably to about 1. 30 o'clock, when the advance brigade of the infantry arrived. I had intended to put the first regiment in on the left, but as the firing had fallen off a little there I sent the first regiment to the support of Colonel Winslow. Colonel McMillen then took charge of the arrangement of the infantry, and formed a continuous and connected line from right to left, covering both roads on the old position of the cavalry. I then received information from some source which I forget now that the enemy was appearing on our left and rear, and I directed Colonel Wilkin, who commanded the brigade second in the line of march, to establish a section of artillery on a knoll near a little bridge some 300 or 400 yards in the rear of the cross-roads, to bear on our extreme left, and to support it with a regiment of infantry. The balance of his brigade I placed in Colonel McMillen's rear to be disposed of by that officer. In the mean time I had authorized General Grierson to withdraw his cavalry as they were relieved by the infantry, reform and reorganize it in the rear and hold it ready to cover the flanks of our line. The enemy now gave away a little before our line of infantry, and I went to the rear to look after the execution of my orders in regard to the establishment of the battery and the safety of the train. I found that Colonel Wilkin had established his section properly, supporting it with the Seventy-second Ohio Infantry, two companies of which he had thrown out toward the left of our main line as skirmishers. The cavalry had accumulated in an open field near by, and were apparently reorganizing. About this time there was quite a lull along the line, and as I did not know whether the enemy might be retreating or changing position I directed Colonel McMillen to push out a strong line of skirmishers and advance his line, and either to drive them or find out what they were doing. Colonel Hoge, commanding a brigade, now sent word that they seemed to be moving toward his right. Colonel Hoge occupied the right of the line. I directed General Grierson to send a portion of his cavalry to the right of the line as soon as possible. In a very short time another message arrived from Colonel Hoge, that he was satisfied that the movement on his right was a feint, and that the real attack would be made on the left. I then sent a portion of the cavalry to the left and established another section of artillery still in rear of Colonel Wilkin, and bearing also on the left of our main line. The cavalry advanced as skirmishers and a considerable fire was opened, more, I think, from our men than from the enemy. In the mean time, however, and soon after I first arrived at Colonel Wilkin's battery, the head of the ordnance train arrived, which had been reported to me a few minutes before about a mile and a half from there. Fearing that it might be in our way in case we were