in the sand-hills, and when our fire was concentrated on any one point they would merely unseen remove to some other.

To the morning of the 22nd our efforts were with the heavy guns that bore on them to interfere with the investing approaches of the enemy. The topography of our front, however, was to their advantage, and they made a steady advance, covering it somewhat with an irregular fire from the batteries already in position, and lining their works already completed with sharpshooters to pick off our gunners. At daylight the fleet was reported moving up to encircle us, and shortly its batteries, in conjunction with those on land, which numbered thirty-six guns and mortars, opened a furious fire, which came from almost every point of the compass, and continued unabated throughout the day, culminating in increased force at sundown, after which the heavy calibers and mortars kept it up during the night. This fire disabled all the heavy guns save two, which did not bear on the land approach, partially breached the walls in several places, and cut up the fort to such extent as to make the whole work a mere mass of debris. Their mortar practice was accurate. Apprehensive from the great effect already had on the walls that my magazines, containing now 80,000 pounds, were in danger in continuation of the bombardment, in the night, with great care and under continuous fire, I had the powder brought out and flooded. The guns in the water and lunette batteries, now unserviceable and in jeopardy from the enemy, I ordered spiked and otherwise effectually damaged. All the guns on the main rampart dismounted by the fire from the enemy were to-night likewise destroyed as of no further avail in defense. Early in the night the wood-work of the citadel was fired by the mortar shells and burned furiously for some hours, the enemy during the conflagration pouring in his missiles with increased vigor. With great efforts the fire was arrested and prevented extending around near the magazines, which would have been in imminent danger of explosion. In the gallant endeavor to prevent this disaster, I would especially mention Privates Murphy, Bumbaugh, and Stevens, First Tennessee, for great courage and daring displayed. At daylight on 23rd (all my powder had then been destroyed) the citadel was again set on fire in several places by shells and burned until it was consumed. The report now made to me was that the casemates, which had been breached, others partially (Captains Johnston, Fisher, and Hughes informed me that another shot on them would bring down the walls of their company quarters), so that a resumption of the severe fire from the enemy would in all likelihood inflict great loss of life, there being no bomb-proof in the fort. The enemy's approach was very near the glacis; my guns and powder had all been destroyed, my means of defense gone, the citadel, nearly the entire quartermaster's store, and a portion of the commissariat burnt by the enemy's shells. It was now evident the fort could hold out but a few hours longer under a renewed bombardment. The only question was, Hold it for this time, gain the eclat, and sustain the loss of life from the falling of the walls, or save the life and capitulate. I capitulated to the enemy at 2 p. m., and through they refused to insert it in the terms, there was a full understanding, and I was assured, that my sick and wounded should be sent at once to Mobile by a flag of truce. This was not done. Considering the great exposure to which the men were subjected, and the fact that shells frequently burst among them when in the casemates, the casualties were unusually small. I inclose a list. *

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*Not found.

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