that an offensive campaign should be made in the enemy's rear and on his line of communications. It is not my purpose, nor does it pertain to me, to explain the reasons which prompted the campaign, but simply to express my concurrence in the views which determined the operations of the army.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALEX. P. STEWART,

Lieutenant-General.

Colonel A. P. MASON,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

Numbers 112. Reports of Major General Samuel G. French, C. S. Army, commanding DIVISION.

HEADQUARTERS FRENCH'S DIVISION,
On the March, October 8, 1864.

GENERAL: Pursuant to the orders received on the 4th instant I moved with my DIVISION from Big Shanty to fill up the railroad cut at Allatoona. Before leaving Big Shanty it was reported that he cut at the depot was fortified and held by the enemy with three regiments, guarding stores of the enemy accumulated there. I arrived near the cut on the following morning about 3 a. m., left one regiment and one piece of artillery at Allatoona Creek to capture the garrison there and burn the bridge, placed the eleven guns in position, supported by two regiments, and move don with the remainder of the DIVISION to surround the enemy's works. Owing to the darkness and the immense rugged hills, and the guide getting lost, had to halt till daylight. Got the troops in position about 9 a. m., and at 10 commenced the attack. At 12. 15 was informed the enemy's infantry was moving on the railroad and entering Big Shanty at 9 a. m., and that his cavalry was moving up on the east side of the railroad. Ammunition, too, being nearly exhausted, and knowing it could not be supplied under two hours, I resolved to withdraw my forces, knowing the enemy could reach the Dallas and Sandtown road before I could. Before withdrawing ordered the stores be burned at the depot. Parties were sent, but all efforts they could make failed to procure fire. The matches furnished would not ignite, and no fire could be procured. The enemy's fire concentrated too protect their stores was heavy and incessant all the time. The troops were withdrawn and formed in line of battle about 3 p. m. The conduct of the troops was beyond all praise. Works after works were carried by hand to-hand conflict, until the enemy was forced into his strong center redoubt on the WEST of the railroad. My losses were in Ector's brigade-43 killed; 147 wounded; missing, 11; total, 201. Cockrell's brigade-killed, 42; wounded, 182; missing, 22; total, 246. * Sears' brigade-killed, 37; wounded, 114; missing, 200; total, 351. * Total loss in DIVISION, 798; and 1 of my staff. The cavalry sent to cut the railroad failed to accomplish the work, and the enemy was heavily re-enforced on the morning of the 5th without my knowledge, and the prisoners report their forces over 2,000. I know they had from seven to ten regiments, and were in force about equal to my own. the

---------------

*But see tables, p, 820.

---------------