one by the block-house at Allatoona Creek, and thence by eh Sandtown road to the Acworth and Dallas road, and he said I could not. Here, then, was General Sherman's whole army close behind me and the advance of his infantry moving on Acworth, which changed the whole condition of affairs. Ammunition had to be carried from the wagons, a mile distant, at the base of the hills, by mn, and I was satisfied it would take two hours to get it up and distribute it under fire before the final assault. I had learned from prisoners that before daylight the place had been re-enforced by a brigade under General Corse. I knew the enemy was in Big Shanty at 9 a. m. By noon he could reach Acworth and be within two miles of the road on which I was to reach new Hope Church. I knew General Stewart had been ordered to near Lost Mountain. My men had marched all day on the 3d; worked all the night of the 3rd destroying the railroad; they had worked and marched all day on the 4th; marched to Allatoona on the night of the 4th; had fought up to the afternoon of the 5th; and could they pass the THIRD day and night without rest or sleep, if we remained to assault the remaining work? I did not doubt that the enemy would endeavor to get in my rear to intercept my return. He was in the morning but three hours distant, and had been signaled to repeatedly during the battle. Under these circumstances I determined to withdraw, however depressing the idea of not capturing the place after so many had fallen, and when in all probability we could force a surrender before night; yet, however desirous I was for remaining before the last work and forcing a capitulation, or of carrying the work by assault, I deemed it of more importance not to permit the enemy to cut my DIVISION off from the army. After deliberately surveying matters as they presented themselves to me, I sent word to General Sears to withdraw his men at once, moving by the route he went it, and directed General Cockrell to withdraw at 1. 30 p. m.

Before the action commended it was foreseen the tit would be impossible to carry any wounded on litters to the road, where the ambulances were placed, owing to the steepness of the hills, the ravines, and the dense woods. Accordingly, the wounded were brought to the springs near the ridge. All that could be moved without the use of litters were taken to the ambulances. The others were left in charge of surgeons detailed to remain with them.

The troops reformed on the original ground WEST of the works and marched back to the south side near the artillery, and at 3. 30 p. m. commAfter the troops engaged in the assault had left, I rode on down to Colonel Andrew's position, in front of the works, and directed him to remain until 5 p. m., and then withdraw and move on in our rear. Before I had determined to withdraw the infantry from the captured works (but after the guide said I would have to return by the way I came) I sent orders to major Myrick to send two of his batteries and his caissons to a point beyond the block-house on the Sandtown road, to act in concert with the troops left there. Having been informed by Colonel Adaire that the block- house at he Allatoona bridge had not been captured I directed Captain Kolb, with hiss battery, that had remained with Colonel Andrews, to move on and report to General Cockrell for the purpose of taking the block-house. Shortly after 4 p. m., and when not a person could be seen in or around the forts, I left the command of Colonel Andrews and overtook the DIVISION near the block-house. Colonel Adaire had burnt the railroad bridge over the Allatoona Creek (over 200 feet long) and the

52 R R-VOL XXXIX, PT I