COLUMBUS, OHIO, July 5, 1864- 5 p. m.

(Received 8 p. m.)

Major- General HALLECK, Chief of Staff:

There is not a soldier that can be spared from this department. The guards are reduced to the minimum at the various military prisons. I am in want of troops to hold the fortifications around Covington and Newport.

S. P. HEINTZELMAN,

Major- General.

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1864- 9. 20 p. m.

Major- General HEINTZELMAN,

Columbus, Ohio:

You will immediately report what forces are threatening the fortifications around Covington and Newport; where they are; what are their numbers, and when you expect an attack.

H. W. HALLECK,

Major- General, Chief of Staff.

MEMPHIS, July 5, 1864.

(Received 11th.)

Major General E. R. S. CANBY:

GENERAL: Your dispatch of the 29th ultimo is received this morning. I have also just received your letter of the 19th June, being sixteen days from New Orleans. I have already written you that to General A. J. Smith I have given every effective man except 100- days' men, whom I regard of no account for field service, and I do not suppose that you wish them sent to Morganza. As soon as General Smith returns you can have his entire force of infantry and artillery if you wish it, as the 100- days' men with my cavalry will answer all my purposes for a garrison here. I am mounting cavalry very fast. I wrote Major- General Slocum ten days ago and desired him, if possible, to make a diversion in favor of Smith, but I can get no answer from him. I suppose he is very weak in cavalry, and I have sent this morning 1,000 cavalry to Vicksburg with instructions to procure such aid as is possible from General Slocum and make a dash for the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, breaking up the MISSISSIPPI Central while on their way. The railroads have been repaired and running from Panola south to Jackson, from Jackson to Selma, and from Corinth to Mobile. To break them up is of great importance. General Smith has a fine force and I believe can handle anything he will meet. Major- General Steele is in no danger, and has, I am advised, a ninety days' supply.

You intimate that Sturgis had too large a train and too much artillery. My orders were to take only wagons for twenty days' supplies and 1,000 rounds of ammunition. The troops went in the lightest possible marching order and we lost about 150 wagons. The country was entirely destitute of supplies and a less number we could not get along with and carry out the objects of the expedition.

The "fall- back" had sixteen pieces of artillery, fourteen of which were lost. It did not fail because they had too much artillery or too many wagons. It should have been a perfect success.

C. C. WASHBURN,

Major- General, Commanding.