onstration on the WEST Point railroad, but were met and driven back, and the bridge was burned by us. As far as I can learn we do not propose any offensive operations, but shall await the enemy's approach and be governed, as heretofore, by the development in our front. All valuable stores and machinery have been removed, and most of the citizens able to go have left with their effects. Much disappointment and dissatisfaction prevails, but there is no open or imprudent expression. You will readily see the advantage the enemy has gained, and that it may not be his policy to strike us on this side of the river unless he sees his success insured. Alabama and MISSISSIPPI will be devastated and our army will melt away. Our railroad communication with Montgomery is now at the mercy of the enemy, and a mere raid may destroy Montgomery, and we would not even know it had moved. This is no fancy sketch, Mr. President, and, however painful, it is my duty to expose it to your view. There is but one remedy-offensive action. This would now be assumed under many disadvantages. Position, numbers, and morale are now with the enemy, but not to an extent to make me despair of success. We should drive the enemy from this side of the river, follow him down by an attack in flank, and force him to battle, at the same time throwing our cavalry on his communications.

Generals Hood and Wheeler agree in this opinion and look for success. But the emergency is so pressing and the danger so great I think troops should be at once drawn from the Trans-MISSISSIPPI to hold the Trans-Chattahoochee Department. On these points I inclose you a copy of a note General Hood. * The suggestion to General Smith I fear will not answer. It is impossible for him to appreciate the vital position here, and delay for explanations may be fatal. I shall proceed to-night or to-morrow to confer with General S. D. Lee-aid him, if possible, in any arrangements to defend his department. At the same time I will endeavor to open communications with General E. K. Smith. The partial returns I have received so far indicate a loss by us from Dalton of more than 20,000 of our effective force. The present effective of all arms and kinds may reach 52,000. The morale, though damaged of course, is still good, and the army would hail with delight an order of battle. The enemy's morale has no doubt improved as ours has declined, but his losses have been heavy, and he operates with great caution. His force has always been overestimated. It is now about 60,000 infantry, 5,000 artillery, and 10,000 cavalry, the latter defeated by us in every conflict during the campaign. During the whole campaign, from and including our position in front of Dalton, General Hood has been in favor of giving battle, and mentions to me numerous instances of opportunities lost. He assures me that Lieutenant-General Polk, after leaving Dalton, invariably sustained the same views. On the contrary, General Hardee generally favored the retiring policy, though he was frequently non- committal. Lieutenant-General Stewart, since his promotion, has firmly and uniformly sustained the aggressive policy. The commanding general, from the best information I can gain, has ever been opposed to seeking battle, though willing to receive it on his own terms in his chosen position.

You will see at once that the removal of the commander, should such a measure be considered, would produce no change of policy, and it would be attended with some serious evils. A general denunciation by the disorganization, civil and military, would follow. I do not believe the second in rank has the confidence of the army to the extent of the

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*See Vol. XXXVIII, Part V, p. 879.

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