me well advised for I now think Hood will rather swing against Altlanta and the Chattahoochee bridge, than against Kingston and the Etowah bridge, but he is eccentric and I cannot guess his movements as I could those of Johnston, who was a sensible man and only did sensible things. If Hood does not mind I will catch him yet in a worse snap than he has been in. Rome is ofno value at all, save as a fland. Destroy its bridges and factories on the slightest provocation, and cover the vital points of our road.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,

Major - General, Commanding.

HDQRS. FOURTH DIVISION, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, October 7, 1864.

Major General W. T. SHERMAN:

GENERAL: The railroad to Chattanooga is all right except the bridges across the Oostenaula and Etowah, the latter having become shaky since 12 m. today, from an unusual rise and consequent drift against the bents. The bridge over the Oostenaula ought to bne done today, and that over the Etowah I had a construction party sent to and will push it in hopes of finishing before daylight. I will go in an ambulance with my command to Cartersville, ready to strike toward Rome, Kingston, orthe Etowah bridge as the case may be. my train of wounded is cut off on this side of the Etowah, and I will leave it here tonight.

we hear nothing of the enemy.

JOHN M. CORSE,

Brigadier - General.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
October 7, 1864.

Lieutenant Colonel W. T. CLARK,

Assistant Adjutant - General:

COLONEL: The signal officer on Kenesaw Mountain tells me he sees heavy cannonading in the directions of Kilpatrict's forces, which fact I thought best to send you for what is is worth.

Respectfully,

CLIFFORD STICKNEY,

First Lieutenant, Signal Corps, U. S. Army.

We have rapid communication with General Sherman when the weather is clear.

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
Near Kolb's Farm,. Ga., October 7, 1864.

Brigadier General T. E. G. RANSOM,

Commanding Seventeenth Army Corps:

GENERAL: I wish you to send a DIVISION immediately. Push the reconnaissance boldly as if a larger column was moving toward Powder Springs. Keep an advance well ahead so as not to engage a large force of infantry, but if a large force should be encountered, let the