Command September September September September

11 12 13 14

BURNSIDE

9th New Frederick. Middletown South

Corps, Market.... ....... ....... Mountain.

Reno.... .....

1st .......... Ridgeville Frederick. Do

Corps, . New .......

Hooker.. Market,

and on the

Monocacy

SUMNER

12th Damascus.. Ijamsville ....do... Do

Corps, . Cross-

Williams Roads

2nd Clarksburg Urbana.... ....do.... Do

Corps, ....... .

Sumner..

.

FRANKLIN

6th Barnes- Licksville Buckeys- Burkitt-

Corps, ville..... Cross- town...... sville...

Franklin Roads..... .

....

Couch's Pooles- Barnes- Licksville Do

division ville.... ville..... .......

......

Sykes' Middle- Urbana.... Frederick. Middle-

division brook..... ..... town...

......

The right wing, consisting of the First and Ninth Corps, under the command of Major-General Burnside, moved on Frederick; the First Corps via Brookville, Cooksville, and Ridgeville, and the Ninth Corps via Damascus and New Market.

The Second and Twelfth Corps, forming the center, under the command of General Sumner, moved on Frederick; the former via Clarksburg and Urbana, the Twelfth Corps on a lateral road between Urbana and New Market, thus maintaining the communication with the right wing, and covering the direct road from Frederick to Washington. The Sixth Corps, under the command of General Franklin, moved to Buckeystown via Darnestown, Dawsonville, and Barnesville, covering the road from the mouth of the Monocacy to Rockville, and being in a position to connect with and support the center should it have been necessary, as was supposed, to force the line of the Monocacy.

Couch's division moved by the "River road," covering that approach, watching the fords of the Potomac, and ultimately following and supporting the Sixth Corps.

The following extracts from telegrams received by me after my departure from Washington will show how little was known there about the enemy's movements, and the fears which were entertained for the safety of the capital. On the 9th of September General Halleck telegraphed me as follows:

Until we can get better advices about the numbers of the enemy at Dranesville, I think we must be very cautious about stripping too much the forts on the Virginia side. It may be the enemy's object to draw off the mass of our forces, and then attempt to attack from the Virginia side of the Potomac. Think of this.

Again, on the 11th of September, General Halleck telegraphed me as follows:

Why not-order forward Keyes or Sigel? I think the main force of the enemy is in your front. More troops can be spared from here.

This dispatch, as published by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and furnished by the General-in-Chief, reads as follows:

Why not order forward Porter's corps or Sigel's? If the main force of the enemy is in your front, more troops can be spared from here.

I remark that the original dispatch as received by me from the telegraph operator is in the words quoted above, "I think the main force of the enemy," &c.

In accordance with this suggestion, I asked, on the same day, that all the troops that could be spared should at once be sent to re-enforce me, but none came.