519 Series I Volume XIX-I Serial 27 - Antietam Part I
Page 519 | Chapter XXXI. THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. |
2. Report of Brigadier General Julius White, of the defense of Harper's Ferry on the 13th and 14th of September, 1862, and the surrender on the 15th.*
3. Report of Lieutenant H. M. Binney, acting aide-de-camp to Colonel Miles, If the same defense and surrender.+
4. Report of Colonel Thomas H. Ford, of the Thirty-second Ohio volunteers, commanding Third Brigade, Maryland Heights, of the defense and evacuation of maryland Heights.++
5. Report of maj. H. B. McIlvaine, chief of artillery, of the part taken by the artillery during the siege of Harper's Ferry.
6. Terms of capitulation at the surrender of Harper's Ferry, September 15, 1862.#
7. List of killed, wounded, and missing on the Union side during the siege of harper's Ferry, September 13, 14, and 15, 1862.
8. Abstract of report Numbers 2 (General White's).//
9. Abstract of report Numbers 3 (Lieutenant Binney's).//
10. Abstract of report Numbers 4 (Colonel Ford's).//
It would appear that there were concentrated at Harper's Ferry nearly, or quite, 13,000 men, all-sufficient for the defense of the post. Of these, 1,500 cavalry were order to leave before the surrender. They made their escape, and never stopped until they reached Greencastle, Pa. On the way they captured some 40 or 50 wagons, with ammunition and other supplies. Eleven thousand two hundred surrendered and were paroled Captain Wood and the remaining 4 men were arrested by General Franklin and sent to Baltimore.
I arrested the captain and handed him over to Brigadier-General Tyler, and have not since heard anything of him. He ought to be dismissed the service.
It may not be improper to remark that I had ordered Colonel Miles to erect a block-house on the highest part of the maryland Heights, and sent a major to superintend the construction of it. This was not accomplished, because the colonel gave it no countenance. i also desired the colonel to abatis the heights of Harper's Ferry. This was also neglected. I also directed him to establish an entrenched camp on Bolivar Heights. Notwithstanding this gross neglect of duty, Harper's Ferry could have been easily defended by 10,000 men.
The only excuse offered was the want of shot for four long-range Parrott guns. Colonel Ward, of the Twelfth New York State Militia, informed me that he had, unexpended, over 80 rounds for the Parrott guns under his command, and I have been told that there were 120 rounds in all, unexpended. But even if it were true that all the shot for the Parrott guns had been expended, that would not have been a sufficient excuse for surrendering before an assault was made, which, I am sure, could have been repelled, if even, as asserted, there were 40,000 of the enemy.
The flanks of harper's Ferry Heights are nearly perpendicular, and the ascent of the front is such that the enemy could not have accomplished it and taken the heights, if they were at all defended. The rear of this position was equally difficult of ascent. To say the least of it, it was a disgraceful surrender and not to be justified or excused.
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*See Numbers 197, report of September 22.
+See Numbers 198.
++ See Numbers 200.
# See White's reports.
// Omitted, the entire reports being printed.
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Page 519 | Chapter XXXI. THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. |