607 Series I Volume XIX-I Serial 27 - Antietam Part I
Page 607 | Chapter XXXI. THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. |
Question. Will you point out on this diagram about the location of that ravine?
Answer. [The witness explained on the map the location of the ravine.] General White replied to Colonel Miles that if he should await an assault on the heights it would then be impossible to withdraw the line to the ravine.
Question. Would the line proposed have been sufficiently contracted to have admitted of proper support by reserves, instead of being compelled to maintain a single line of battle, as was necessary on Bolivar Heights?
Answer. In my opinion, it would, and I think it would have been a much more advantageous position than to undertake to contend against an assault made by the enemy on the heights. It would have been nearer the supports from the intrenchments on Camp Hill, and if the enemy had shown themselves on Bolivar Heights to attack the position General White proposed, the guns at Camp Hill could have attacked them by firing right over our troops.
Major WILLIAM H. BAIRD, called by the Government, and examined as follows:
By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:
Question. Will you state what position you hold in the military service?
Answer. Major of the One hundred and twenty-sixth New York.
Question. Will you state briefly the circumstances which led to the evacuation of Maryland Heights?
Answer. Will I commence from the time I went upon the heights?
Question. Begin when you went over there, when you had personal knowledge of what you state.
Answer. On the 12th of September last I was field officer of the day. I was out visiting the lines of pickets, when I received orders to rejoin my regiment at once, as we had marching orders. They sent an orderly for me. We started about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, I think, or 3.30. The regiment at that time was under command of Colonel Sherrill. I believe his orders were to report to Colonel Ford at or near McGrath's battery. We halted there, and he went to report, which I suppose he did, to Colonel Ford. Major Hewitt, of the Thirty-second Ohio, then conducted us from the battery on to the heights. When we got on the heights we heard picket firing or slight skirmishing. We advance up to the skirmishers and found a company of the Thirty-second Ohio, under the command of Captain Hibbets. It was then about the sun an hour, or perhaps three-quarters of an hour, high. We formed in line of battle across the mountain in rear of the skirmishers, expecting an attack. We could hear the enemy in pretty large force, by their talk, as I judged; we could hear numerous commands given as they were forming in line of battle, as I supposed by their commands. We could hear once in awhile a word that would indicate something of that kind. We remained there over night. The skirmishing ceased when it became dark. However, they kept up a pretty sharp skirmish from that time until dark. We laid on our arms all night. In the morning, Colonel Sherrill detailed Company B, of our regiment, and advanced it on the left of Captain Hibbets' company of the Thirty--second Ohio, to act with him on the same line of skirmishers. They were attacked by a large skirmishing force at first, and driven pretty well in to our lines. They rallied and drove the enemy back again. In the mean time our men, thinking they were gaining a victory or getting the advantage, all set up a shout, which discovered their strength to the enemy, I thought. About a half an hour from that time, or perhaps a little over (this was after surprise; perhaps the sun was half an hour high or more-we could not tell on the mountain), they came out with a large force. They were pretty well scattered over the woods and formed a longer line than we did. Our men, with a great deal of talking to and orders being [given] that they were not to fire until they received the command to fire, allowed the skirmishers to go to the rear, which they did in the center. The flanks being on the sides of the hill, they could not get around the flanks very well. There was a road leading near our center-passing through our center. We were formed across the brow of the mountain; they fired by file, and fired about three or four times, I should think.
Page 607 | Chapter XXXI. THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. |