HARRISBURG, PA.,

September 10, 1862. (Received 5 p. m.)

Major General H. W. HALLECK:

Following just received from Hagerstown operator:

Jackson's advance within 3 miles of this place. He has only his own corps. I will retreat along the line of the railroad and tap the wire.

A. G. CURTIN.

HARRISBURG, PA.,

September 10, 1862-6.30 p. m.

Major-General HALLECK:

Colonel Wright will not reach Washington until to-morrow morning. Under the pressing circumstances, I deem it my duty to ask for the immediate presence of an officer of high rank, clothed with full powers to act for the Government, as I design t call out the militia of the State for its defense to-morrow, unless the information of the advance of the rebels, as communicated to you, should prove unfounded.

A. G. CURTIN,

Governor of Pennsylvania.

HARRISBURG, PA.,

September 10, 1862-10 a. m.

General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, Rockville:

Your message received. I have letter from clergyman, dated Taneytown, Md., Sunday night, in which he says:

One of my elders, a reliable man, traveled 7 miles through their camps on Sunday. Their force around Frederick is not less than 120,000 men, and the part under Lee had not joined that army.

He conversed with many officers and men. They appeared to believe their whole army in Maryland would exceed 200,000 men, and their intention was to march either upon Harrisburg or Baltimore, probably the latter. Men ragged and filthy, but full of fight. Our news from Hagerstown is good. General White, at Martinsburg, reports all well. No enemy near Hagerstown or approaching in that direction. Confidence is being rapidly restored there. From all we can learn, the enemy has selected his ground and massed his force near Frederick, to give you battle, the result of which will probably decide the future of our country.

A. G. CURTIN,

Governor of Pennsylvania.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
September 10, 1862-10.30 p. m.

ANDREW G. CURTIN,

Governor of Pennsylvania:

Everything that we can learn induces me to believe that the information you have received is substantially correct. I think the enemy are checked in the directions of Baltimore and Gettysburg. You should concentrate all the troops you can in the vicinity of Chambersburg, not entirely neglecting Gettysburg. I will follow them up as rapidly as possible, and do all I can to check their movements into Pennsylvania. Call out the militia, especially mounted men, and do everything in your power to impede the enemy by the action of light troops; attack them in flank, destroying their trains and any property which must inev-