I earnestly request that if the resources of the War Department can control the matter, that they be used to their utmost to re-enforce the thinned ranks of these regiments.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General, Commanding.

SPECIAL ORDERS, HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Numbers 254. Camp near Frederick, Md., September 13, 1862.

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II. Major General J. Sedgwick is assigned, temporarily, to the command of the Second (Banks') Corps, late Army of Virginia, and will immediately enter upon duty accordingly. Brigadier General O. O. Howard will relieve Major-General Sedgwick in the command of his division.

By command of Major-General McClellan:

[S. WILLIAMS,]

Assistant Adjutant-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, September 13, 1862.

General SLOUGH, Alexandria, Va.:

General Banks wrote me last evening that he would give the proper orders, so that you would be duly supplied with troops.

H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON,
Washington, September 13, 1862.

Brigadier General S. WILLIAMS,

Asst. Adjt. General, Headquarters Army of the Potomac:

Upon further consultation with the General-in-Chief, he has authorized me to assign General Barnard to duty as chief engineer of all the defenses from the 3rd instant, leaving the question of command on the north side as it was previously under Woodbury and Haskin. I have to-day issued orders to that effect. In regard to General Barnard, the arrangement now conforms to the wishes of the commanding general. I hear from Baltimore that the rebels left Westminster about noon yesterday, going toward Union town and Smithsburg. They were, it is said, 400 strong and two pieces of cannon, and said they would be back in stronger force in a few days. This I think has been already communicated. What news have you?

N. P. BANKS,

Major-General.

WASHINGTON, September 13, 1862.

General D. P. WOODBURY,

Commanding over Eastern Branch:

GENERAL: The idea I have as to the system of works on the other side is that it is impossible to maintain any line. An enemy in force, say to the north of us, may make a sudden effort that way and break through the intervals. We cannot have troops enough on that side to