extend the left wing of my line, in order to cover this supposed outlet for the Indians with the guns. The battle now raged with great fury for some time on both sides. The enemy successively, by a desperate charge, attempted to turn my right and left flanks, but they were repulsed with slaughter. They fell in every direction in front of my line by the unerring aim of my brave soldiers, who, both officers and men, fought with the courage and coolness of veterans, exposed as they were to a galling fire from the enemy during the whole time. At this juncture I became convinced that House's battalion, mistaking my command in the darkness for Indians, were firing into it. I therefore ordered my men to fall back out of range of House's guns and mount their horses, as the Indians were now in a rout and were fleeting out of range of my guns up a ravine some distance to the front. The horses becoming alarmed, and to a considerable extent unmanageable for a short time, created a slight confusion as the men were in the act of mounting, but it was only momentary, as my squadron were in a few moments again formed in line on the crest of a hill 200 yards in the rear of my last line of battle, mounted and ready to follow up the victory, as the enemy were fleeing, leaving everything behind them. But it being dark, and in view of the position of the Sixth Iowa, I deemed it imprudent to attempt a pursuit before morning, as it was then 8.30 or 9 p. m. Having no means of communicating that night with the general commanding, I ordered my men to dismount and lay on their arms, holding their horses, until early dawn, when I marched from the battle-ground of the previous evening, and went into camp about 1 mile from it and at the upper end of the Indian encampment. On passing over the ground of the recent encampment of the Indian and of the battle, I found that the enemy had abandoned all their tents, clothing, cooking utensils, valuables, supplies, and, in fact, everything they possessed was strewn over the ground of their retreat for miles. Their flight had been so precipitate that they had abandoned everything but their dead, whom they carried away as fast as they fell. Their rout was so complete and their flight so sudden that many of their children were left behind on account, as I suppose, of their being an incumbrance to their flight. From the best information derived from guides, the enemy's strength was not less than 1,000 warriors. Their loss in killed will not fall short of 150, as scouts sent out next day after the battle report their dead as scattered over the country for miles on the lines of their retreat, and their wounded is twice that number.

The casualties in the Second Nebraska Cavalry are 2 killed, 13 wounded, and 10 missing men. There were 5 horses killed, 9 wounded, and 9 missing. I found among the effects of the Indians Minie rifles and rifle cartridges; also several boxes of army revolvers and rifle cartridges were found, and various other articles, some of which were undoubtedly taken from the whites in the late Minnesota massacre. The enemy was composed of Santees, Brule, Yanktonais, and Blackfeet Sioux, and Cuthead Indians, and were evidently the same Indians with whom General Sibley recently had an engagement on Apple Creek. The Indians are now destitute of supplies, clothing, and almost everything else, they having abandoned all except their ponies and arms. Many of the former were, however, killed or captured during the battle. I would have pursued the enemy the following morning after the battle had it not been for the exhausted condition of my men and horses.

The officers and men under my command are not only entitled to my thanks, but the confidence of their country, for their bravery, efficiency, and promptness on this occasion. Not a man in any capacity flinched