flank movement under cover. When we reached the enemy's extreme right we received his fire from behind the breastwork of logs and rails, distant now about 100 yards. The order was immediately given to my regiment to fall down and creep up to the crest of the hill, where we opened fire and maintained it brickle, driving the enemy in upon his center. Having been ordered to make a reconnaissance, not an attack, we ceased firing, and lay in our position to await further orders, sending Lieutenant-Colonel Mason to report to result of our reconnaissance to Generals Benham and Rosecrans. I have since learned through a prisoner taken by us that our fire cleared the enemy from his works on the right and drove him in on his center.

After waiting as I supposed a sufficient length of time, and fearing that Colonel Mason had lost his way in the thick underbrush, I drew down my eight companies into the ravine and back into the main road, and then went in person to report to Generals Benham and Rosecrans. This I did, and requested that a brigadier might lead us to an attack upon the enemy's extreme right. A brigade, consisting of the Twenty-eighth Ohio, eight companies of the Thirteenth Ohio, three of the Twenty-third Ohio, and two of the Twelfth Ohio Regiments, was extemporized by General Rosecrans, and I was placed in command and ordered to carry the works on the right by assault. I formed the command as above constituted in the ravine, and was then ordered by General Rosecrans to halt and await further orders. We remained in this position for about one hour, when General Rosecrans ordered me to move forward to the attack. I reached the head of my column and started just at dusk. Before we could march down the ravine through which we had passed before and countermarched up the right-hand slope, so as to draw out my line on the flank and in front of a portion of the enemy's line, it became so dark and the men so weary, having marched from 3 o'clock in the morning, that it was found impossible to ascend to their line. The ground was covered with rocks and a dense undergrowth of laurel, and Colonel Moor reported that it would take until 2 o'clock in the morning to get tow companies of his regiment up.

I then ordered the whole column to face about, and marched out just as it had marched in, and crossed the ravine to the rear of the column to lead it out, when a short or two from the enemy's skirmishers, or an accidental shot from one of our own pieces, caused the whole column, doubled as it was into a "U" shape, to open fire, killing two and wounding about thirty of our own men. The melancholy mistake was at once discovered, and the column extricated and marched back by the left into the main road, and so on back to the grounds selected for our encampment.

At the beginning of the action my section of two rifled cannon, under command of Captain Schneider, and supported by his company (E, Thirteenth Regiment), was ordered by General Benham to take position in the road by which our columns approached, and at a point about 400 yards distant from the enemy's works. Several shots were fired from this position with good effect. Captain Schneider then found a better position for his guns about 100 paces to the right, an duct a road to it with his sword and one hatchet, and from this new position, in full view of the enemy's battery, he fired 75 rounds of solid shot and 15 of shells. His shot plowed through the parapet of the enemy's battery spreading consternation among those who served the pieces. Captain Schneider and his men behaved with great gallantry, delivering their fire with coolness and accuracy, although exposed to a brisk fire from the enemy's battery and from his musketry. The same may be.

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