artillery. The action had come upon us so suddenly that Lieutenant Brown's battery, separated by a long interval from the infantry,maintained itself on our extreme right, and poured a most destructive fire upon the flank of the enemy's line of battle during his advance and retreat.

Colonel Carroll's brigade came up after General Caldwell's division had passed him, and took position to cover our left flank on a line perpendicular to the railroad.

General Gregg's cavalry division also arrived and took post behind our line. His batteries were with the infantry column during the attack of the enemy, but by some misunderstanding passed off the field toward Brentsville, and did not participate in the repulse.

The enemy's troops now began to arrive and take position on our left. The prisoners we took showed them to be Ewell's corps.

It would have been impossible to withdraw from my situation in daylight in presence of such superior forces of General Lee.

The position I held was good except on my left, and such that the enemy could only ascertain my force by a heavy attack. Relying upon the effect of the first repulse, I deemed that he would not do this till all his army arrived, and this would take the remainder the day. To move was to disclose my comparative weakness and invite immediate attack, and even if successful would open the way to Brentsville, at which place was a large portion of our wagon train, protected only by Buford's cavalry.

Major Ludlow, of General Meade's staff, who had been with me thus far (to whom I am indebted for valuable aid), now left me, and I told him to report what he had seen. I did not ask for assistance, not knowing for a certainty that I might be deceived as to the force of the enemy around me, and disarrange other important plans. I received the following communication from General Sykes:

I have just sen Major Ludlow. It is everything that the army should be concentrated at Centreville. I think you ought to move toward Manassas as soon as dark, if not before. The longer you delay, the more force they can bring against you, and, if Lee's army is on your left, two corps are little better that one. I have sent word to General Meade that I shall stay at Manassas until dark, unless I see the head of your column sooner coming this way.

Another advance against our right was attempted, but the fire of our artillery alone caused it to be abandoned.

I then sent word to General Sykes that I would like to have his support on my tight. Affairs grew more and more alarming on my left, and, expecting the next attack there, all my preparations were made to meet it, and General Webb, holding the right, was kept in readiness to re-enforce the left.

Skirmishing continued along the left of my line during the arrival and deployment of General Ewell's forces, and just at dusk of evening some batteries opened against our left for the purpose of enfilading our position. This was promptly answered by our own artillery, and this cannonading continued till some time after dark, but without much effect. Just about this time, too, the head of General Sykes' force came to our support.

The arrival of night prevented our being attacked by this overwhelming force. General Lee says in his report:

Before the rest of the troops could be brought up, and the position of the enemy ascertained, he retreated across Broad Run.

About 9 p. m., after all was quiet, I withdrew from my position according to instructions, bringing off all of our wounded that could be found, our prisoners, and captured artillery.