of the enemy on the left and front of the position I was moving my division from.

While resting in this position I received the note Numbers 8 (from General Kilpatrick) and also wrote the dispatch, Numbers 9, stating the information of a deserter just then come in that A. P. Hill's corps was over Robertson's River and turning the right, the postscript to which was made at General Kilpatrick's request. I also received two dispatches, 10 and 11, by one messenger near here. I had brought Colonel McAllister into the road and pushed my head of column a little farther into the road and pushed my head of column a little farther along, where these were received. Upon the receipt of them, I wrote the dispatch Numbers 12, which expressed in reality the actual feeling I was acting under prior to receiving them. It was nearly 6 p.m. I was half a mile from Brown's Store, personally attended by my staff. With them I reconnoitered the whole front, and found no change, no additional need of support to the cavalry anywhere. General Davies, unmoved, was firing with his rifle guns at James city, being in perfect safety on account of the new position of the infantry. The skirmishing became a little more brisk at this time on account of the arrival of more cavalry, and some firing took place from the bench of Thoroughfare Mountain, aimed toward Kilpatrick's position at Bigger's. There was nothing anywhere upon which I could change my intentions already in operation, and as I was certain that nothing would be done by the enemy till their turning project was resolved by them, I tried to get my men to their intended bivouac by dark, ordering General Mott to attend to this.

Previous to leaving him, in conference with General Kilpatrick, I made arrangement to leave with him Colonel Burling's command, with permission for it to take position at Brown's Store, with a body of cavalry under General Davies, for the night. There was no difficulty whatever in maintaining the position with cavalry, and I had no misgiving in leaving Colonel Burling, supported by me, but I could not leave my whole command without support in any position to invite a turning operation, unless some object was pointed out to me for doing so. As my aim was "to support the cavalry," rather than to occupy the position of cavalry, I did so till in the night of this day I received the peremptory order, Numbers 12 [13], to rejoin the corps for the purpose of moving elsewhere. This order disturbed two most comfortable bivouacs, that of my main force and that of the detachment under Colonel Burling, at about the time that they were falling asleep amid fields of the most cheerful rail fires ever lighted; but in the morning we were where our orders directed that we should be, the entire division and battery.

If I have given a clear narrative, it will be apparent from it that I did not retire from the support of the cavalry till in the night, and probable that General Kilpatrick, in reporting that he could hold his position, referred to the one at his headquarters (which Colonel Burling said he could hold without cavalry), and this is supported by the fact that the postscript to my dispatch, Numbers 9, was written at his request, he being with me at the time I wrote it; but it is probable that my designs were not fully comprehended through defects of expression committed by myself. Their true interpretation lies in what I actually did with my command.

The extreme right of the main position of the army was between Stone-House Mountain and Pendleton's, on the Sperryville turnpike.

21 R R-VOL XXIX, PT I