About this time General Cooke in person reported to me that the enemy would take him in flank as he moved forward. This was reported to General Hill, who informed me that General Anderson's division had been, or would be, ordered to the right. General Cooke was informed of this, and the forward movement commenced. Walker had not been able to form line of battle on Kirkland's left. The two brigades (Cooke's and Kirkland's) moved off in handsome style. The skirmishers soon became engaged. The enemy's strength in my front was only known from the reports made by Captain Johnston, Engineer Corps. As subsequently shown, it proved to be Warren's, Second Army Corps.

Marching parallel to the railroad, the enemy was concealed from our view by hills and woods. On seeing our advance the enemy formed his line in rear of the railroad embankment, his right resting on Broad Run and hidden by a railroad cut. In his rear a line of hills ascended to some 30 or 40 feet in height, giving him an admirable position for his artillery. The railroad cut and embankment at the foot of the hill gave him perfect protection for his infantry.

In rear of the enemy's right, on the hills just noticed, a circular line of rifle-pits had been thrown up for the protection of the bridge over Broad Run. These rifle-pits were filled with infantry, and a battery was established in rear and higher up the hills.

As Kirkland moved forward his left struck the enemy in the railroad cut near Broad Run. He drove everything in his front along the line of the railroad before him, but was unable to carry the second line of works (rifle-pits, &c.,) that were in his front. When in the railroad cut his men were exposed to an enfilading fire from his right, in addition to a severe fire from a battery on the north side of Broad Run. The position was untenable. He was compelled to fall back. A number of his men, unwilling to expose themselves, remained in the railroad cut and were captured.

General Cooke was wounded early in the action. When within some 500 yards of the railroad, his brigade halted and commenced firing. It subsequently charged up to within 40 yards of the railroad embankment, but was driven back, being exposed not only to a heavy fire from the enemy behind the railroad embankment, but also to a fire on its right flank. The enemy's batteries, during the advance of Cooke and Kirkland, completely swept the field over which the advance was made. As soon as Cooke's brigade gave way, I ordered General Davis to form his brigade on Cooke's right, thus protecting Cooke from a flank movement.

During the advance of Cooke and Kirkland a battery belonging to McIntosh's battalion, Anderson's division, was ordered to take position on a hill about 500 or 600 yard from the railroad, and about opposite Kirkland's right flank and Cooke's left. This battery was captured by the enemy. I was ignorant of the fact that a battery had been ordered to occupy this position until it had been taken. A knowledge of its position on my part, however, would not have saved it, as it would not have been deemed necessary to have furnished a special support for it, so long as the two brigades (Cooke's and Kirkland's) were in its front. On receiving information that the enemy's skirmishers were approaching the battery,and that it was in danger, a regiment was ordered to its support, but arrived on the ground after give guns had been taken off.

During the advance of Kirkland, Walker gained ground to the left,