was anxious to see me immediately. It bore that date [17th], but as there was no hour named it was impossible for me to tell whether it had been written very recently or early in the morning. It was marked in haste, and the relay courier who delivered it stated that the one from whom he obtained it had broken down his horse. Not knowing what might have happened, I deemed it proper to move back with as little delay as possible.

That night I bivouacked Hampton's division near the Little River turnpike, and on the 18th moved back to Gainesville, where I understood what the commanding general's instructions were, and also received information of the retrograde movement of our army. Toward night I moved with Hampton's division above Hay Market for forage and supplies, and encamped on the road.

The same night I received intelligence of an intended advance of the enemy, consisting of Kilpatrick's division of cavalry and six pieces of artillery, with a column of infantry in rear, these having moved out from Fairfax Court-House the previous day. Our pickets were attacked just at dark, and being reported to me as driven in, gave me great concern for my own position. I moved one brigade (Young's, which had to saddle up in a terrible rain-storm) to Hay Market to hold that point. It was found, however, that our pickets still had possession of Gainesville, and the command pressed on without difficulty toward Buckland, our rear guard being followed at a respectable distance by the enemy. I immediately communicated with Major-General Lee and directed him to watch out on my right flank. The enemy's cavalry having, during my absence, recrossed Bull Run in Major-General Lee's front, he had fallen back on the 16th with his division to Bristoe, where they threatened him all day, but were repulsed by a few shots from his artillery, and now occupied a position with his entire command in the vicinity of Auburn.

Selecting advantageous positions for sharpshooters and artillery along Broad Run, I determined to delay the enemy until Major-General Lee, who had been notified to come to my support, could arrive, knowing that I could at least delay the enemy, and believing if Kilpatrick was detached, as I supposed he was, I could inflict upon him severe injury. The enemy was baffled in repeated to abandon the attempt in my front while moving detachments toward my flanks.

About this time I received a dispatch from Major-General Lee stating that he was moving to my support, and suggesting that I should retire before the enemy with Hampton's division in the direction of Warrenton, drawing the enemy after me, when he would come in from Auburn and attack them in flank and rear. I at once assented to this arrangement, and sending back word to Major-General Lee that I would be ready to turn upon the enemy at his signal gun, I retired with the division slowly before the enemy until I reached Chestnut Hill, within 2 1/2 miles of Warrenton. This plan proved highly successful. Kilpatrick followed me cautiously until I had reached the point in question, when the sound of artillery toward Buckland indicating that Major-General Lee had arrived and commenced the attack, I pressed upon them suddenly and vigorously in front, with Gordon in the center and Young and Rosser on his flanks. The enemy at first offered a stubborn resistance to my attack, but the charge was made with such impetuosity, the First North Carolina gallantly leading, that the enemy broke and the rout