nence, covering the road. A portion of our artillery was then put into position, and the rebels were soon forced to retire. During this short engagement, Lieutenant Merritt was sent to the extreme right and Lieutenant Denicke to the left, with orders to communicate with the center station. This was done, and the enemy having withdrawn to the summit of Droop Mountain, I ordered Lieutenant Merritt to open communication to General Averell's headquarters from our advanced pickets.

On November 6, the rebels still held the position on Droop Mountain to which they had retired the previous evening, as our forces moved forward to attack them. Lieutenant Denicke was ordered to the left, with orders to communicate with center station, and with Lieutenant Merritt on the right. Lieutenant Denicke took his station on a knob occupied by one of our batteries. From this point he kept constant communication with center station, although the enemy kept up a heavy fire on that point from their artillery, even after our battery had been removed, the signal flag there attracting their fire.

During the latter part of the engagement, I ordered Lieutenant Denicke to change his station to the new position taken by our artillery. From this station he also communicated with center station, sending and receiving messages and observing the enemy's movements. This station was the first to observe and communicate to the commanding general that the rebels were falling back.

I ordered Lieutenant Merritt to report to Colonel Moor, commanding the Twenty-eighth Ohio and Tenth [West] Virginia Infantry, who made a flank movement on the enemy's left. Lieutenant Merritt was instructed to communicate both with center and station on our left. I pointed out to the lieutenant the direction that this force was to take, and the nature of the ground was plainly visible. I watched for Lieutenant Merritt's flag myself, and had a man continually on the lookout, but at no time during the engagement was I enabled to communicate with him. When, after the engagement, I inquired the reason of this, he stated in explanation that only at one time had he seen my flag (center station), and that at that time it had been impracticable to open the desired communication, as some trees interfered with the view.

The center station occupied various positions, it always accompanying the commanding general.

As soon as I was notified of the retreat of the enemy, I called in the station on our left, and proceeded without delay to the summit of Droop Mountain, the position held by the enemy during the engagement, with the view of obtaining some position from which to observe the valley beyond in which the enemy were moving. On the summit I was joined by Lieutenant Merritt. The whole party then pushed on with our cavalry, who were in pursuit of the enemy, but although the pursuit was carried on until after dark, I could not find the desired position, the view in all directions being obstructed by hills densely covered with brush and timber.

On November 7, the column resumed the march early, in direction of Lewisburg. Lieutenant Denicke was sent with the advance guard to communicate to the rear any intelligence of note. At Lewisburg we found General Duffie with four regiments of cavalry, who had arrived there at 11 a. m.

Sent Lieutenant Merritt, November 8, with a company of cavalry to Edgar's Ford, on the Union road (distance 5 1/2 miles from Lewis-