he occupied prevented the efficient use of lines of battle, concealed his force so as to require caution in advancing, and furnished him the means of rapidly constructing breastworks, which he had done. They day closed without a junction of my force with any other. My loss was about 50 killed and wounded.

The First Corps, which had been called from the left column in the afternoon, arrived within about a mile of my rear just about dark, and before daylight on the 28th moved up and took position in line of battle on my right, south of the turnpike. The Sixth corps also took position on my right just before daylight.

At sunrise the First and Second and Sixth Corps advanced simultaneously in line of battle, only to find that the enemy was gone. Our rapid advance soon came upon him in a strong position on the west bank of Mine Run, about 2 miles from Robertson's Tavern. Deserters picked up as we advanced told us that Hill's corps had come down the plank road from Orange Court-House, and there joined Ewell's corps, so that we found General Lee's army in a formidable position, and partially intrenched. A heavy rain came on early in the day, and somewhat obscured our observations of the enemy.

A personal reconnaissance, during which I lost 20 men killed and wounded, along, our front, made as close to the enemy as our most venturesome skirmish line could approach, failed to discover to me a promising point of attack. I stated this to the commanding general in the evening, when all our troops had been brought into position, and requested to be allowed to take my corps and make a demonstration in the enemy's right, to threaten it, and endeavor to discover a more favorable position to assault, and finally, if this could not be done, to move on around as if to get in his rear, with the intention of making him abandon his present front. This plan was acquiesced in, and General Terry's division of the Sixth Corps, about 6,000 strong, was sent with me, and 300 cavalry. As I intended making an extended and rapid movement, I left nearly all my ambulances and ammunition trains behind, half my artillery, and the rear ammunition chests of my caissons. The movement being one that might be long and fatiguing, required the men to start fresh.

No inconsiderable preparations were required to issue rations, dispose of surplus trains, relieve our line, &c., along the enemy's front, and all combined determined me not to start till daybreak. The night was dark and stormy, and our route, after going to the rear as far as Robertson's Tavern, lay through woods along bad roads. The cheerful tone of my men as I began the move on the 29th of November, the unsought expressions of opinion from officers in all grades of my command, told me plainly enough that their views - tried soldiers as they were - did not differ from mine as to the impracticability of an attack on the enemy where we had left him. Our march on the 29th was rapid and unobstructed, until we reached (about 10.30 p. m.) the cavalry outposts of General Gregg on the plank road. Our march up to this point was 8 miles.

In company with General Gregg, I reconnoitered the enemy while my column was closing up. Just behind the enemy's vedettes, he pointed out a line of intrenchments, and so it seemed to me to be; it afterward proved to be the railroad embankment. I at once ordered up General Caldwell's division, taking care to conceal our movement, deployed the Irish Brigade to the right of the plank road,