ADDENDA.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
December 7, 1863-4.15 p. m.

Commanding Officer Second Corps:

SIR: The major-general commanding requests that you will correct an expression in your report arising from a wrong impression on your part respecting the action of General French. He did not decline to assault, but reported against its practicability. The expression referred to is-

General French had declined to assault in his front as being impracticable.

This should be, "General French had reported an assault in his front to be impracticable."

You would oblige the major-general commanding by making some change to that effect.

Very respectfully,

A. A. HUMPHREYS,

Major-General, and Chief of Staff.

Numbers 10. Report of Colonel Nelson A. Miles, Sixty-first New York Infantry, commanding First Brigade, First Division.

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, SECOND CORPS,
December 11, 1863.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submitting the following report:

My brigade started from camp on Mountain Run on the morning of the 26th ultimo, crossed the Rapidan at Germanna Ford, and two regiments (Eighty-first and One hundred and fortieth Pennsylvania Volunteers) forded the river, marched within a mile of Wilderness Tavern, and there bivouacked. On the morning of the 27th, marched until the head of the column met the enemy near Robertson's Tavern. During the day the brigade held several positions, but was not engaged, the division being held in reserve. Remained here for the night. The enemy having fallen back during the night, we again advanced, finding the enemy at Mine Run, strongly intrenched. The brigade remained in line during the entire day, 28th. At 6 a. m. 29th, the brigade marched to New Hope Church. Near this point I received orders from General Caldwell to advance on the left of the railroad cut, and deploy the Sixty-first New York Volunteers, Eighty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, and the Twenty-sixth Michigan Volunteers as skirmishers at once-pace interval, the One hundred and fortieth Pennsylvania Volunteers marching by the right of companies to the front as a support. I advanced in this order 3 miles without any other support than of my own brigade, driving the enemy's cavalry and infantry until my right was within 500 yards of the left of the enemy's works. Here my right flank was much exposed to their infantry and artillery, and Stuart's cavalry on my left. I was obliged to halt, and wait for more than an hour for other troops to come up. So unexpected and rapid was this advance that the enemy seemed to be taken by surprise, and were dislodged at every point without halting.