my head of column advanced to the Raccoon Ford road intersected the latter intermediately between those two places, about 2 miles from either.

The instructions for the movement of the corps from headquarters Army of the Potomac, dated November 23, 1863, were:

The Third Corps, having crossed, will move on the Jacobs' Ford and Robertson's Tavern road, and take post on the right of the Second Corps, on the road from Raccoon Ford to Robertson's Tavern, covering the right from approach in the direction of Bartlett's Mills.

From the reports received from the commander of the leading division and staff officers, I was satisfied that to move forward in the order of march prescribed in the orders issued by me on the 23rd instant (appended, marked D), would subject the column to an attack on its flank before it could extricate itself from the woods, and I felt myself compelled to maneuver from the rear of my column to the left, while the head of the column held its position near the Raccoon Ford road.

This embarrassment I early communicated to the general commanding, and was directed by dispatch, dated 11.15 a. m.:

If you cannot unite with General Warren by the route you are on, you most move through to him by the left.

And again, at 1.45 p. m.:

Your dispatch of 11.45 is received. The major-general commanding directs that you attack the enemy in your front immediately, throwing your left forward so as to connect with General Warren at Robertson's Tavern. The object of an attack is to form a junction with General Warren, which must be effected immediately.

Up to this time my efforts had been directed to ascertain the practicability of forcing my head of the column through the opposition in its front. I now directed my order of battle, causing the Third Division to extend on the left of the Second Division, which was already halted and deployed. While the Third Division was taking position, the enemy were found posted toward the left and forming line of battle in that direction. This division was soon closely engaged, as will be seen by the report of General Carr. The enemy were repeatedly driven back, particularly in front of Morris' and Keifer's brigades.

At about 3 o'clock I ordered the First Division (Birney's) into the second line to support the Third Division (Carr's), which relieved that line about 4 o'clock. The enemy apparently heavily re-en-forced made a simultaneous attack upon the right and left flanks of the line. At this time I had thrown into position Battery K, Fourth Artillery, on the left Second Division, which in a few minutes afterward was charged very fiercely, but the enemy were repulsed with great loss. Shortly after reforming it was again attacked with the same result. The Second Division now moved forward, took and maintained the ground yielded, as did the division on the left. A desultory firing was kept up until some time after dark, on both sides, when it ceased. Our pickets were thrown forward across the battlefield, those on the right on the Raccoon Ford road, and those on the left to a point about 1 1/2 miles from Robertson's Tavern.

Toward the close of the engagement, and when the pressure seemed heaviest upon my flanks, I called upon General Sedgwick to re-en-force them, which he promptly did, but the enemy had retired, and his troops were not engaged. The reason that the repulse of the