moving up Dunlap's Creek toward Sweet Springs. This information led me to believe that it was a combined movement on the part of Scammon and Averell, and that while Scammon would take the route by Alderson's Ferry, Averell would take that by Sweet Springs and Gap Mills, both coming into my rear. I therefore withdrew my small command this side of Union to a position at which I thought I could repulse both Averell and Scammon combined, or from which I might strike them separately.

On the night of the 15th, I learned that Averell, instead of coming to Union, had crossed Sweet Springs Mountain with a force estimated at from 2,000 to 4,000 cavalry had a battery of six pieces, and that Scammon was falling back to Meadow Bluff. Other information I received induced me to believe that the movement from the Kanawha and Beverly was only for the purpose of engaging the attention of the troops about Lewisburg, and enable Averell to penetrate the country and strike the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. I telegraphed you of the raid, and asked you to send troops to the vicinity of Salem, and disposed of my troops as I thought best to prevent his escape, sending Echols' brigade to Sweet Springs Mountain and Colonel McCausland over the Salt Pond Mountain to Newport.

I apprehended that after striking the railroad at Salem, Averell would move westward, destroying the railroad, central depot, and New River Bridge. I accordingly ordered General Ransom to move the infantry of his division without delay to Bristol, that I might send it by railroad where it might be needed, and Colonel Browne, who was guarding the salt-works, to proceed without delay to New River Bridge. General Ransom referred my order to Lieutenant-General Longstreet, under whose orders, it seems, he was acting, who declined sending the troops to Bristol, saying they were under his orders, as he conceived, by order of the President. I was not aware of any such order. Colonel Browne, with his fine regiment (the Forty-fifth Virginia Infantry), repaired promptly to New River Bridge, and was there in ample time to protect it.

A heavy rain swelled the stream so much as to retard the movement on the 17th. Early on the 18th, I joined Echols on the top of Sweet Springs Mountain, where he had taken a strong position, effectually barring the escape of General Averell by that route. In the night of the 18th, General Echols received a dispatch from Major-General Early, dated the morning of the 17th, stating that he was at Buffalo Gap with two brigades en route to Millborough, and that he would take part of his force to Warm Springs. I supposed that this movement of Early's was ordered by General Lee, and that instead of stopping at Millborough, he would move on to Covington, as I had asked. I dispatched Major-General Early, suggesting that instead of stopping any portion of his command at Warm Springs he move it to Morris Hill, on the turnpike from Warm to White Sulphur Springs, and place a strong picket at Callaghan's. A short time afterward General Echols received another dispatch from General Early, asking him to take position on Sweet Springs Mountain and blockade that road. There were three other routes between New River and Covington, besides that which General Echols occupied, by which General Averell could escape. One of these (that by Salt Pond) Colonel McCausland effectually barred at Newport, the other two were blockaded and picketed by my order.

Early on the morning of the 19th, General Averell, who was