ing him to hold that position, preventing any more passing, and, if the enemy had passed, to close in on their rear.

Although dark, conceiving that a movement could be made by which all that portion of the enemy on this side of the bridge could be cut off and eventually captured, and deeming the movement one of the greatest importance, I undertook the personal superintendence of the same, having, as I conceived, given all the necessary orders for the corresponding movements. The movement was a success.

The command of Averell was divided, one portion across the bridge and the other on this side. I could not ascertain then the extent of the division. When this was accomplished, I still had communication with Colonel Arnett, in the rear, but soon afterward I received a verbal dispatch from him that he was being pressed and was falling back. I directed Captain James McGuffin to communicate to Colonel Arnett my order to hold his ground, prevent the passing of the enemy, or if he failed in that, to press to his rear.

Captain McGuffin not returning, with members of my staff, I attempted to get to the rear, so as to communicate with and direct Colonel Arnett's movements, but was compelled to abandon the effort by the demonstrations of the enemy. Finding Major Lady, with 50 men, I moved with him to a position near the bridge, and directed him to resist all efforts of the enemy on the same side to get to the bridge. Three times during the night did this little band successfully repel attempts to reach the bridge by the enemy on the same side, and they held this position until 8 a.m. of the 20th instant.

I omitted to mention that when I first arrived near the bridge, believing that a considerable force had not yet crossed, I attempted to burn the bridge, but was compelled to desist by the overwhelming force guarding it. Soon after daylight the bridge was burned by the force on the opposite side, General Averell evidently giving up that portion of his command cut off from him as lost.

The enemy, thus cut off as it seemed (there appeared to be about two regiments), then made a show of attack on Colonel Arnett, and

throwing out large flanking and surrounding parties (by this time they had ascertained how small the force was with me), compelled me to fall back to the top of the mountain with the small detachment under Major Lady, and, not being pressed in the rear, took the position I had occupied. Colonel Arnett was at least three miles from me. Captain Downs could not support me, nor could I communicate with him. I made every effort to communicate with both, but could not do so for the enemy. They thought I was captured, or otherwise disposed of, as I had been seen in the midst of the enemy. Citizens who had known the river all their lives had assured me (Colonel Arnett knew this) that it was not possible to cross it at any ford in the county for two more days of dry, cold weather. The result shows that I committed an error in placing any reliance upon their representations, or upon the efforts of the home guards.

Colonel Arnett, therefore, conceiving that the bridge being burned, the river not fordable, the enemy would be compelled to fall back on him, took position to prevent their reaching the railroad bridge and the taking of McGraw's Gap route; but instead of doing that they made but a feint to do so, and burning their train, (some thirty wagons) they took the railroad track to a ford 2 miles above the bridge, and there succeeded in crossing - not, however, without drowning a number of men and horses in the effort - before