to the adjutant-general, who answered me in the affirmative. But in the course of half an hour I was ordered by you, through Acting Quartermaster Syme, to move my regiment up the Rich Patch road, to intercept the ambulance train of the enemy, which I under stood to be guarded by 200 of the enemy. I received a subsequent order to press the rear of the enemy in case he passed the road upon which I was advancing; to cross over on the pike leading to Covington at the second culvert.

I advanced on said road (the Rich Patch) throwing forward 2 men and an advance guard of 20 men, under command of Lieutenant Boggs, who fired upon the enemy, who had just left the road upon which I was advancing. There, as you are aware, the three roads make an acute angles triangle. We were all under the impression that the enemy had turned about and was coming back southward. I immediately, under that belief, dispatched my orderly to you for orders whether I should combat them there or fall back and fight them at the road - I mean the railroad. Your ordered me to take position and fight them until I found my position untenable, and then retire to the railroad.

All this time Lieutenant Boggs with his squad were firing upon them. I took position, but by reconnoitering and scouting I discovered the enemy to be stationary, in considerable force, and in a splendid position. Not desiring to attack, which I believe (and which many of my officers believed) would have resulted unprofitably, except by aiding to carry some plan of yours into execution, I again sent for orders by my orderly, who was captured.

About this time I received intelligence that, you having thrown yourself in the enemy's front, communication was cut off, and that the enemy were coming down the pike in the direction of Jackson's River Depot. I immediately moved my regiment to that road, leaving a picket (or rather a squad) under Lieutenant Boggs to harass the enemy at the point which we had just left.

Arriving at the pike where I had been early in the evening (at the intersection of Rich Patch with Covington road), I sent two companies (Alexander's and Walkers's) to try and communicate with you, but both were driven into the mountains. I several times during the night tried to get a dispatch, and in several different manners, but without success. Supposing, therefore, that you and the Nineteenth Regiment were both either captured or, having burned the bridge, had fallen back on the Covington side, I determined to take our old position at Alum Rock, and if the enemy should attempt to pass by the railroad bridge and through McGraw's Gap, to foil him in this purpose. But the enemy not making his appearance, as had been expected, upon that road at daylight, I determined at all risks to move on him, ordering Captain Lurty to move up his battery and shell the roads in which they were encamped, both to drive them out and to notify you, wherever you might be, that I intend fighting them. I moved my regiment up.

At the first Rich Patch road, sending Lieutenant Opie with 50 men to press them on the road leading across the hill to the second culvert on the Covington road (leaving Captain Camp in charge of my regiment at the first culvert, with orders to forward every dispatch from Lieutenant Opie to myself), I moved up Captain Lurty's battery - as we supposed between two columns of the enemy - to shell the one on the Covington road. As soon as Lieutenant Opie reported I moved my regiment (under Captain Camp) rapidly in pursuit of