not attack the enemy with a reasonable prospect of success. My command had been reduced, not only by the desertions above mentioned, but by a large number of sick and worn-out men left at Beverly and Buckhannon, and a great many detailed as guards for the various droves of cattle on their way east, leaving me not over 2,200 or 2,300 effective men. General Jones had, I believe, about 1,200. Defeat so far in the interior would have been destruction. We therefore determined to separate on the morning of the 6th, General Jones going west to attack the Northwestern Virginia Railroad, and I to move southward to Summerville, in Nicholas County, where we would unite again. Some days previous to this, I had sent a dispatch to General Samuel Jones, informing him that such would probably be our route, and suggesting a co-operative movement on his part against the enemy at Fayetteville and in the Kanawha. This dispatch I sent into Braxton by 15 of my own men, with instructions to get it through by any possible means in their power. They employed a faithful citizen to take it to Lewisburg, but it has never been heard from since.

On the 6th, I ordered back all the sick and stores from Buckhannon and Beverly to Monterey, and moved toward Summerville at an early hour. The roads were so horribly bad that at night we had only reached a point 5 1/2 miles from Weston.

The next day, with extraordinary labor, we made 2 1/2 miles, and on the 8th 6 miles more, making 14 miles in three days, and to do this with my battery I had to destroy the spare wheels of my battery and throw away fifty solid shot from each caisson. Up to the 9th it rained hard fourteen days, and was clear only six, and the roads everywhere were almost impassable, and my animals rarely got any food except the young grass we found along the road. No incident of interest occurred on the march until we reached Big Birch River, in Braxton, on the evening of the 12th. At Bulltown, Suttonville, and Big Birch the enemy had block-houses and intrenchments, and had destroyed at each place large amounts of stores laid in for the summer's campaign. I destroyed their quarters and block-houses at these several places.

On the night of the 12th, I received a dispatch from Colonel Imboden, who was 12 miles in advance, that he had heard the enemy was preparing to evacuate Summerville, and had determined to attack them at once, and asking me to support him as soon as possible. At 2 a. m. that night another courier arrived with intelligence that Colonel Imboden had entered Summerville and found the enemy gone about an hour, his force consisting of the Ninety-first Ohio and two companies of cavalry; that he immediately pursued and overtook him about 6 miles on the way to Gauley Bridge; made a vigorous assault on the rear guard (mounted), capturing 23 prisoners, 28 wagons loaded with supplies, and 168 mules and their harness. Two of the wagons were smashed up in the melee. All the others he saved, and the teams. I immediately ordered reveille, and by a forced march of 20 miles, tired as my men were, reached Summerville at 3 p. m., and found all safe and quiet. Colonel Imboden had less than 200 men with him in this affair, in which he captured the train of over a regiment of the enemy and brought it safely away. The capture was most handsomely made, and was most opportune. The men had only been allowed half a pound of meal per day after leaving Beverly, and our scanty supplies were exhausted. We had but one day's salt left, as a part of our original stores had been sent back from Beverly to lighten transportation, and expected to get none until we reached Greenbrier. The artillery and wagon horses were almost worn out, and these fresh mules enabled me to relieve them.