horses became entangled in the harness, and in freeing them he received a shot in the foot. This wound he his form his men, but in a movement received one in the spine, and from the effects of it died in two days after. I would, if possible, here pay a slight tribute to his memory, but I cannot. He was na educated and accomplished officer, just budding into the full vigor of manhood. As a line officer he has shown fine abilities, and on the battle-field was unsurpassed for gallantry. Lieutenant Sanderson, before and after the fall of Lieutenant Dimick, conducted himself with great courage, judgment, and decision.

The division artillery was now confined entirely to the brow of the hill, but Seeley was to the left and in front of the Twelfth corps batteries. Seeley took this position by order of General Hooker, and it being so far removed from the other batteries (about 600 yards), I could pay no personal attention to it; besides, I had unbounded confidence in his judgment and in his battery. The best report I can give will be the body of his report, which will be found below. The battle was now beginning with almost unparalleled fury, the enemy throwing his troops upon us in double and triple lines, and then in solid masses. The infantry of the division fought with stubborn desperation, and the contending forces surged backward and forward like two huge waves, mingling and unmingling as the one or the order gained a momentary advantage.

It was at this time that the artillery carried the most fearful havoc among the enemy's forces. The batteries of Winslow and Dimick here bore the same part, and I can do no better in giving you a clear understanding of the part each bore in the engagements than to quote from Winslow's report. He says:*

To the part Lieutenant Seeley bore, I quote from his report. He says:+

During the heat of the battle, I perceived the firing of my guns began to slacken, and learning the ammunition was giving out, I applied immediately for another battery of Captain Randolph, chief of corps artillery, and though he gave me orders for Captain von Puttkammer's Eleventh New York Independent Battery, I could not get him to the front, and I was compelled to withdraw my guns, and thus caused the gallant old division to fall back before the rebel masses. I withdrew the batteries to the ammunition train, and in three hours they were ready for service again.

On the 4th, nothing of special interest transpired to the batteries.

On the 5th, we were ordered by General Hunt to recross the river, and to proceed to our present camp.

In refitting the batteries for whatever service they might be called to perform, I was compelled to resort to the unpleasant alternative of temporally unhorsing the Fourth New York Independent Battery, Lieutenant William T. McLean commanding, and putting it in position the bluffs on the north side of the United States Ford. It has since been again placed on its original footing.

I am frank to say that I fell the utmost gratification at the management of the artillery by its immediate commanders, and the favorable results it produced on the battle. I can scarcely conceive it possible that more destruction could have been carried into our enemy's force by three light batteries than was apparently by our own; how the firing could have been more accurate; the coolness and judgment which

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*The tenth, eleventh and twelfth paragraphs of Winslow's report (No. 157, p.456) here quoted.

+The third and fourth paragraphs of Seeley's report (No. 158, p.489) here quoted.

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