GENERAL ORDERS,
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Numbers 32.
Camp near Falmouth, Va., March 30, 1863.

The following-named officers are announced as serving on the staff of the major-general commanding, in addition to those mentioned in General Orders, Numbers 2, of January 29, 1863, from these headquarters, viz:

Brigadier General G. K. Warren, volunteer service.

Colonel E. Schriver, inspector-general.

Lieutenant Colonel N. H. Davis, assistant inspector-general.

Lieutenant Colonel E. R. Platt, captain Second Artillery, judge-advocate-general.

Major S. F. Barstow, assistant adjutant-general.

Colonel G. H. Sharpe, One hundred and twentieth New York Volunteers, deputy provost-marshal-general.

Captain Ulric Dahlgren, aide-de-camp.

Captain Charles E. Cadwalader, Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, acting aide-de-camp.

By command of Major-General Hooker:

S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA.,

March 30, 1863.

Commanding Officer, Aquia Creek Landing:

The defenses of this place consist of a line of slashing, running from King's house, on Aquia Creek, south to Accakeek Creek, strengthened by two redoubts and an advanced redoubt near Watson's house, occupying a position from which the enemy might shell the landing. These redoubts are numbered from right to left, Numbers 1 being near the Watson house, Numbers 2 on the Stafford Court-House road, and Numbers 3 near the rail road. The enemy might attack, first, to force their way at once to the depots; secondly, to reach the hills immediately over the depots to shell the latter; thirdly, by shelling depots from north side of Aquia Creek, or simultaneously engage or threaten the redoubts and shell the depots from the north side. The first two attacks would fail if the advanced redoubt and defensive line were held. To do this, Redoubt Numbers 1 will have a garrison of 100 men and no guns; Redoubt Numbers 2 a garrison of 200 men and two 3-inch guns; Redoubt Numbers 3 a garrison of 100 men and four 3-inch guns, these guns at Redoubt Numbers 3 being outside the work. There should be a post of one company where the slashing ends at Aquia Creek, to prevent cavalry moving along the shore, and a reserve of 800 men near Redoubt Numbers 2, to move when needed. One gunboat, at least, should be kept at Aquia Creek, to prevent the enemy from putting a battery imposition on the north side of Aquia Creek, to shell the depots, and should be assisted by the guns taken from the redoubts and placed on the hills immediately over the landing, these hills completely commanding the north shore of Aquia Creek. In case the defensive line were forced, the gunboat would be of service in the immediate defense of the depots.

The commanding officer will keep up an efficient system of outposts and lookouts, so that there may be no possibility of surprise. It is doubtful if a cavalry raid would attempt to bread through the line without first carrying one of the redoubts. The reserve should move to the threatened point, and, keeping a sufficient sub-reserve, take an