the enemy's movements, so as to act accordingly. This raid is unquestionably made to divert our attention from the Rappahannock and Suffolk. If Roberts and Kelley will act promptly, they can cut Jones completely off. It is believed that his entire force is not over 3,000.

H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief.

WHEELING, VA.,

April 28, 1863.

General RIPLEY:

Post-office, banks, &c., all packing up to leave. Fifteen hundred Imboden's cavalry within 30 miles.

I have no men nor trains. Shall I blow up the depot in case it is necessary?

A. R. BUFFINGTON,

Captain of Ordnance.

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1863-1.10 p. m.

Captain A. R. BUFFINGTON,

Wheeling, Va.:

Your telegram has been received and submitted to the General-in-Chief. The Government property should be defended with all the means possible, and to the last extremity. Only in case of absolute necessity should the property at the depot be abandoned, and then not until it has been destroyed, or otherwise rendered useless to the captors.

J. W. RIPLEY,

Brigadier-General, Chief of Ordnance.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, April 28, 1863-1.30 p. m.

Major-General SCHENCK,

Baltimore, Md.:

Have you no troops in Pennsylvania and Maryland which can be promptly thrown into Wheeling by the Pennsylvania Railroad? The enemy seems to march more rapidly than we move by rail.

H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief.

BALTIMORE, MD., April 28, 1863-3 p. m.

(Received 4.30 p. m.)

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief:

I have no troops in Pennsylvania or Maryland to send to Wheeling. All are on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, or south of it. I have spared every man and gun from this vicinity, except the garrisons of the forts and the ordinary railroad and hospital guards.

ROBT. C. SCHENCK,

Major-General, Commanding.